Fem IR Supplement v3

{Umich K Lab 2022}

# AT: Marxism

### Alt d/n solve – Genderless

#### Turn – their analysis presumes of the state as a genderless agent – the aff is key to reveal the state as a site of gendered performativity

Wadley, 2010. (Jonathan, PhD in IR from Florida and currently professor of IR and sexual politics at San Diego. “Gendering the State: Performativity and Protection in International Security,” in *Gender and International Security* edited by Laura Sjoberg, pp. 40-41 - spp)

The analysis presented here challenges the discipline’s tendency to treat states as genderless persons by exploring the role of gender in the security performances of states. In doing so, it draws upon the concept of performativity – the idea that, in the words of Judith Butler, “identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expression’ that are said to be its results.” It argues that performances within the field of security, much like performances within the daily lives of people, carry no intrinsic meaning, but must be made sense of through “a system of symbolic meaning” that cannot be but gendered. Through such performances, identities become salient, and masculine and feminine subjects are created. While this process is less palpable for states than it is for humans, it is nonetheless observable in broad patterns. States can be observed reifying themselves through performances of security, particularly through those which establish them as stable and masculine protectors. Recent work on the politics of protection, particularly that done by Didier Bigo, suggests the constitutive effects that protection has upon both providers and recipients. It stops short, however, of recognizing that these effects may be enabled by the gendered meaning that different forms of protection carry. When such meanings are considered, it becomes evident that by “being” masculine protectors, states can position themselves favorably in relation to other international actors and gain legitimacy from their domestic audiences. This means that states are gendered, and are gendered in much the same way as people are: through repeated performances. When state identity is viewed in this light, the anthropomorphic assumption, as it is commonly used, appears woefully inadequate. To be clear, it is not being suggested that drawing parallels between human subjects and state subjects is bad in-and-of-itself. Indeed, useful parallels can be drawn, despite (or, perhaps, because of) the notion that “both states and persons are fuzzy sets.” The trouble lies in assuming that states, or people, are constituted outside processes of interaction, and that either can be made sense of without considering the relational identities they take on through the systems of symbolic meaning through which they operate. Anthropomorphic assumptions tend to treat the state as a genderless, unitary actor – often, one that is ontologically primitive to its interactions – while neglecting the ways that the “actor-ness” and “unity” of the state are an effect of iterated, gendered performances, particularly in the realm of security. By viewing security performances with an eye toward their constitutive effects, and by moving gender to the center of that analysis, one gains not only a richer understanding of how states reproduce themselves (i.e. where their person-like “identities” come from), but a clearer picture of the hierarchical relations that exist among states and between states and domestic populations. This chapter begins with a consideration of how the state has been conceived of a person throughout the discipline, arguing that such practices almost always import an inadequate understanding of how people are constituted. In both cases, conceptualizing states and conceptualizing humans – this is a result, largely, of substance-oriented, as opposed to process-oriented, approaches. It argues that by making processes, rather than substances, the core of research, scholars will be able to more fully explain how states reproduce themselves as actors in world politics, how they garner power for themselves (in relation to other international actors, particularly states), and how they gain legitimacy from their subjects. Following that, the chapter argues that a theory of performativity can fill this need, especially in the realm of Security Studies. Moreover, such a theory would facilitate the study of gender within these processes and shed light on the incentives states have to behave as masculine actors. The final section of the chapter offers, tentatively, a way for empirical research to bear on the theoretical sketches presented here. It submits that “the rational protector model” may be examined as a type of dominant masculinity for states, one which allows them to “do” security ways that cast them as unitary, masculine actors.

### Marxism = Sex-Blind

**Marxism is sex blind**

**Hartmann, 2006** - Heidi Hartmann is a feminist economist and the founder of the Institute for Women's Policy Research, a scientific research organization formed to meet the need for women-centered, public policy research, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union, HEIDI I. HARTMANN, *United States 1945- . Economist. Founding Director of the Institute for Women's Policy Research (1987).* Capitalism and Women's Work in the Home, 1900-1930 *(1976),* Women's Work, Aden's Work: Sex Segregation on the Job (1981), Comparable Worth: New Directions for Research *(1985),* Women, Work, and Poverty: Woman-Centered Research for Policy Change *(2006).*

T**he "marriage" of marxism and feminism has been like the marriage husband and wife depicted in English common law: marxism and feminism are one, and that one is Marxism.** **Recent attempts to integrate marxism and feminism are unsatisfactory to us as feminists because they subsume the femi­nist struggle into the "larger" struggle against capi­tal.** To continue our simile further, either we need a healthier marriage or we need a divorce. The inequalities in this marriage, like most social phenomena, are no accident. **Many marxists typical­ly argue that feminism is at best less important than class conflict and at worst divisive of the working class. This political stance produces an analysis that absorbs feminism into the class struggle**. Moreover, **the analytic power of marxism with respect to capital has obscured its limitations with respect to sexism.** We will argue here that while marxist analysis provides essential insight into the laws of historical develop­ment, and those of capital in particular, **the categories of marxism are sex-blind.** **Only a specifically feminist analysis reveals the systemic character of relations between men and women.** Yet feminist analysis by itself is inadequate because it has been blind to his­tory and insufficiency materialist. **Both Marxist anal­ysis, particularly its historical and materialist method, and feminist analysis, especially the identification of patriarchy as a social and historical structure, must be drawn upon if we are to understand the development of western capitalist societies and the predicament of women within them**. In this essay we suggest a new direction for marxist feminist analysis. I MARXISM AND THE WOMAN QUESTION The woman question has never been the "femi­nist question." **The feminist question is directed at the causes of sexual inequality between women and men, of male dominance over women. Most marxist analyses of women's position take as their question the relationship of women to the eco­nomic system, rather than that of women to men, apparently assuming the latter will be explained in their discussion of the former. Marxist analysis** of the woman question has taken three main forms. All **see women's oppression .in our connection** (or lack of it) **to production**, **Defining women as part of the working class, these analyses consistently subsume women's relation to men under worker's relation to capital**. First, early marxists, including Marx, Engels, Kautsky, and Lenin, saw capitalism drawing, all women into the wage labor force, and saw this process destroying the sexual division, of labor. Second, contemporary marxists have incor­porated, women into an analysis of evervdav life in capitalism. In this view, all aspects of our lives are seen to reproduce the capitalist system and we are all workers in the system. And third,, marxist femi­nists have focused on housework and its relation to capital, some arguing that housework produces surplus value and that houseworkers work directly for capitalists. . . . While the approach of the early marxists ignored housework and stressed women's labor force par­ticipation, the two more recent approaches em­phasize housework to such an extent they ignore women's current role in the labor market. Never­theless, **all three attempt to include women in the category working class and to understand women's oppression as another aspect of class oppression**. **In doing so all give short shrift to the object of feminist analysis, the relations between women and men.** **While our "problems" have been elegantly analyzed, they have been misunderstood**. The focus of Marxist analysis has been class relations; the object of marxist analysis has been understanding the laws of motion of capitalist society. While we be­lieve marxist methodology can be used to formulate feminist strategy, these marxist feminist approaches discussed above clearly do not do so; their marxism clearly dominates their feminism. Marxism enables us to understand many as­pects of capitalist societies: the structure of pro­duction, the generation of a particular occupational structure, and the nature of the dominant ideology. **Marx's theory of the development of capitalism is a theory of the development of "empty places."** Marx predicted, for example, the growth of the proletariat and the demise of the petit bourgeoisie. More pre­cisely and in more detail, Braverman among others has explained the creation of the "places" clerical worker and service worker in advanced capitalist societies.2 **Just as capital creates these places indifferent to the individuals who fill them, the cat­egories of marxist analysis, class, reserve army of labor, wage laborer, do not explain why particular people, fill particular places. They give no clues about why women are subordinate to men inside and outside the family and why it is not the other way around.** **Marxist categories, like capital itself, are sex-blind. The categories of Marxism cannot tell us who will fill the empty places. Marxist analysis of the woman question has suffered from this basic problem.**

### Marxism Fails

#### Marxist strategies fail— subjectivity reformations like the aff are key in a world that has moved to neoliberalism

Oksala 15 Johanna Oksala is currently Academy of Finland Research Fellow (2012-2017) in the Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies at the University of Helsinki, and a Visiting Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research, USA (2013-2015). Her books include Foucault on Freedom (2005), How to Read Foucault (2007) and Foucault, Politics & Violence(2012). “Johanna Oksala on Foucault, Marx and Neoliberal Subjects”, Theory Culture and Society, February 16th 2015 <http://theoryculturesociety.org/johanna-oksala-on-foucault-marx-and-neoliberal-subjects/> rishi

It is my contention that Foucault’s “post-Marxist” insights about the intrinsic link between productive practices of power and forms of the subject must remain central in our critical analyses of the neoliberal turn. While in many Marxist accounts neoliberalism is understood simply as an intensification of capitalist exploitation, which is heightening the fundamental class antagonism between capitalists and laborers, from a Foucauldian perspective it must be understood as a new configuration of power relations that produces new forms of the subject. We have to recognize the historically specific ways that the instability and the persistent crises of capitalism have been negotiated in recent decades through neoliberal forms of governmentality – new political technologies of power and social regulation. Many socialist writers have lamented that the retreat from class analysis in the academy in the eighties and nineties was one of neoliberalism’s most effective weapons because it prevented class-consciousness from developing as the appropriate response to the rise of neoliberalism.[[3]](http://theoryculturesociety.org/johanna-oksala-on-foucault-marx-and-neoliberal-subjects/#_ftn3) While the spread of neoliberalism is clearly inseparable from the structural logic of capitalist accumulation, to view the subjects it produces simply as class subjects who lack the appropriate consciousness of their situation is nevertheless problematic in my view. While it is important to acknowledge that in his lectures on neoliberalism, The Birth of Biopolitics(2008), Foucault describes technologies and rationalities rather than their actual empirical outcomes, empirical and experiential evidence gives weight to the theoretical claim that the neoliberal reorganization of Western societies has resulted in new forms of the subject – a new understanding of ourselves. Social volatility and economic risks have become increasingly central for profit making and the financialization of everyday life requires new kinds of subjects and social networks (Floyd 2009, 196). Neoliberal governmentality has dramatically extended the reach of the markets and market rationality and thereby produced the corresponding subjects who are compelled to behave as market actors – consumers, individual investors and entrepreneurs – across several dimensions of their lives. As Foucault shows, neoliberal techniques scramble the traditional opposition between capitalists and workers in the sense that subjects are increasingly conceived and conceive themselves as entrepreneurs of the self, who attempt to maximize their “human capital”. Whether we focus on the reforms of pension plans and healthcare, revisions of copyright laws or the restructuring of universities, we are increasingly required to view ourselves as market-actors and to behave accordingly.[[4]](http://theoryculturesociety.org/johanna-oksala-on-foucault-marx-and-neoliberal-subjects/#_ftn4) These new forms of governmentality and social regulation are misrecognized insofar as they are identified as “merely” cultural or superstructural.[[5]](http://theoryculturesociety.org/johanna-oksala-on-foucault-marx-and-neoliberal-subjects/#_ftn5) The historically specific practices of power in which we must engage daily in order to go about our lives are not just symbolic, cultural or discursive practices as Foucault’s Marxist critics sometimes claim. They are essentially material, social and economic practices that are organized through neoliberal rationality and embedded in law and political institutions, but also in everyday social relationships. Hence, we are not confronted merely with ideological fiction that could be dispelled through the development of appropriate class-consciousness; we are confronted with a new kind of social reality. What the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberalism downplays in my view, however, is the necessary “failures” of neoliberal governmentality to constitute entrepreneurial subjects – the neoliberal constitution of “others”. The obstacles in the way of developing class consciousness are also “objective” in the second sense that we are witnessing other, radically new forms of subjectivation that are brought about by the global, neoliberal turn: the unemployed and the undocumented subjects, as well as the neocolonial, disposable subjects of the global South. It is widely acknowledged by numerous socialist writers that the composition of the workforce has dramatically changed in the last decades due to the globalization and neoliberalization of our economies. The industrial working class has been shrinking in all Western countries at a rapid rate, and has been largely replaced by post-industrial, service-sector workers, who are largely female and in part-time or precarious employment. Instead of social relations based on relatively stable forms of wage-labor, the growth of insecurity and negative flexibilization have come to increasingly characterize all work. Moreover, the majority of the poorest and the most oppressed people in the world today are not wage-laborers. They are people who have to eke out a precarious existence in the informal economy because capitalism appears to have no use for them at all. In other words, the forms of exploitation have not only assumed radically new forms, but it has become increasingly unclear what the class relations are and how we are situated in their intersections. It is imperative to also theorize these new forms of the subject and the political potential they hold for radical social transformation. That requires acknowledging the limits of both Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism, as well as traditional Marxist class analysis, and moving beyond them.

### AT: Root Cause - Defense

#### Cap can’t explain all gendered violence

**Rubin 1975** (Gayle, Professor of Sociology at the University of Michigan, one of the foundational figures in modern gender theory and well-honed reader of Marx, “The Traffic in Women…”)

Given the individual, the production of labour-power consists in his reproduction of himself or his maintenance. For his main-tenance he requires a given quantity of the means of subsistence.... Labour-power sets itself in action only by working. But thereby a definite quantity of human muscle, brain, nerve, etc., is wasted, and these require to be restored.... (Ibid.:171) The amount of the difference between the reproduction of labor power and its products depends, therefore, on the de-termination of what it takes to reproduce that labor power. Marx tends to make that determination on the basis of the quantity of commodities—food, clothing, housing, fuel—which would be necessary to maintain the health, life, and strength of a worker. But these commodities must be con-sumed before they can be sustenance, and they are not imme-diately in consumable form when they are purchased by the wage. Additional labor must be performed upon these things before they can be turned into people. Food must be cooked, clothes cleaned, beds made, wood chopped, etc. Housework is therefore a key element in the process of the reproduction of the laborer from whom surplus value is taken. Since it is usually women who do housework, it has been observed that it is through the reproduction of labor power that women are articulated into the surplus value nexus which is the sine qua non of capitalism. But to explain women's usefulness to capi-talism is one thing. To argue that this usefulness explains the genesis of the oppression of women is quite another. It is precisely at this point that the analysis of capitalism ceases to explain very much about women and the oppression of women. Women are oppressed in societies which can by no stretch of the imagination be described as capitalist. In the Amazon valley and the New Guinea highlands, women are frequently kept in their place by gang rape when the ordinary mecha-nisms of masculine intimidation prove insufficient. "We tame our women with the banana," said one Mundurucu man (Murphy, 1959:195). The ethnographic record is littered with practices whose effect is to keep women "in their place" —men's cults, secret initiations, arcane male knowledge, etc. And pre-capitalist, feudal Europe was hardly a society in which there was no sexism. Capitalism has taken over, and rewired, notions of male and female which predate it by centuries. No analysis of the reproduction of labor power under capitalism can explain foot-binding, chastity belts, or any of the incredible array of Byzantine, fetishized indignities, let alone the more ordinary ones, which have been inflicted upon women in various times and places. The analysis of the reproduction of labor power does not even explain why it is usually women who do domestic work in the home, rather than men.

### AT: Root Cause - Offense

#### Hegemonic masculinity was a precondition to the universalization of liberal economic subjectivity

Burke 2002. (Anthony, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27.1, InfoTrac OneFile)

These insights have direct relevance to the international conduct of states. Christine Sylvester has argued that there is a pernicious "normativity of sex" structuring international relations, while Tickner argues that statecraft is dominated by an image of "hegemonic masculinity" that is "sustained through its opposition to various subordinated and devalued masculinities such as homosexuality . . . and through its relation to various devalued feminities." In international policy, the characteristics of hegemonic masculinity "are projected onto the behaviour of states whose success as international actors is measured in terms of their power capabilities and capacity for self-help and autonomy." (53) What this achieves is a whole series of exclusions (and norms of action) based on the dichotomy between masculine and feminine. This generates a chain of analogous oppositions that align maleness with reason, activity, objective truth, and the mind, and woman with passion, passivity, subjective truth, and the body--realms and values constructed as perpetually threatening, backward, and disruptive. By then aligning these with two other crucial dichotomies--between savage and civilized, and the commonwealth and the state of nature--this chain of oppositions gives life to the progressive movement of being central to a post-Enlightenment politics of security. In the liberal chain that links subjectivity, economy, and geopolitics, gender is simultaneously a work on the self, a principle for the participation of individuals in society, and one for the conduct of the state in managing subject populations and constructing geopolitical space. Hegemonic masculinity has also been crucial to universalizing the liberal mode of economic subjectivity based around the subjugation, control, and exploitation of nature--with the implicit exclusion of other possible modes of economic life. (54) A pivotal figure here is Descartes, whose philosophical account of method and the division between mind and body has underpinned many characteristics of the modern liberal order: its obsession with political and epistemological certitude (stability and equilibrium), the vision of nature implicit in modern economics, and the control and production of international space. Genevieve Lloyd emphasizes how the separation of mind and body was essential to his vision of a "unitary pure thought" t hat secured the foundations of modern science, yet simultaneously separated it from the rest of life. Lloyd also draws out the links between Cartesian method and Hegel's association of male attainments with universality. Maleness becomes a technical attribute achieved by breaking away from the nature associated with woman, and thus analogous to modern theories of technological, political, and economic progress based on the manipulation and control of nature. (55)

### Perm

#### **Double bind – either the aff is a DA to the alt, or the aff is included and you vote for the perm: Capitalism relies on gendered hierarchies, means the aff is key**

Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in *feminist review* 109: 49-72, spp)

This paper draws upon, and seeks to extend, existing feminist analyses of the causes, constitution and effects of financial crisis to argue that crisis, governance and austerity are best understood by interpreting the discursive reproduction of crisis governance discourses and their feminist Frankenstein creation, what this paper refers to as ‘crisis governance feminism’. Existing feminist scholarship has, at length, detailed how capitalism, in all its forms and at macro, micro, local, regional and global levels, is gendered. Feminists have contested the seductively clean and unified agenda of ‘one world’ future prosperity lovingly perpetuated by neo-liberalism and its advocates and have highlighted instead ‘the messy, contradictory and disjointed processes of global restructuring that have monopolised the politics of development in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries’ (Griffin, 2010a: 91). Feminists have analysed and campaigned on economic crises extensively, interrogating the gendered impacts of the 1980s debt crisis (see, e.g., Sen and Grown, 1987; Benería, 2003), the East Asian crisis (Truong, 1999; Ling, 2004; Floro et al., 2009; Seguino, 2009) and the Argentine crisis (Chrabolowsky, 2003; De Cicco, 2011). Feminist discussions of global finance and crisis have displayed in stark relief the gendered injustices and inequalities created and sustained by various crises, the ‘retrogression of individual capabilities’ (Fukuda- Parr et al., 2013: 24), particularly those of women, created by financial crises, the social costs to women of austerity and the organisational manipulations of gender rhetoric that reaffirm existent and unequal economic policies and power relations (see, e.g., Montgomerie and Young, 2010; Roberts and Soederberg, 2012; Fukuda- Parr et al., 2013). As feminist analyses have so convincingly argued, ignorance of the local and social constitution of global processes leads only to flawed scholarship and ignorant policy-making that further exacerbate, or even create, hierarchies and inequalities of labour, class, gender and sexual relations. For feminists, regimes of capitalist production and consumption are always gendered. The reproduction of assumptions of individualism, market economics and democracy, perpetuated by neo-liberal governance mechanisms as pre-given and beyond question, mean, in particular, that neo-liberalism and its advocates have often failed to recognise that ‘the commercialisation of everyday life and of all sectors of the economy generates social dynamics that many individuals and cultures across the globe might find repulsive’ (Benería, 2003: 73).

#### **The perm is key – centering gender in discourse analysis is essential to check against the universalizing discourse of the alt**

Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in *feminist review* 109: 49-72, spp)

Adding to this extensive body of feminist literature, this paper interrogates crisis governance as discursively gendered, and the effects of this. A discursive approach is significant because it does not assume, as per liberal approaches, a foundational economic rationality to economic strategy, or, as per Marxism, the central truth of class struggle as universal. A discursive approach that centralises gender in understanding the reproduction of crisis governance discourses under- stands governance and its outcomes as a complex amalgamation of meaning and practice, founded by and reproduced through culturally produced and pervasively gendered ideas, assumptions and values about the world. A commitment to non- essentialism challenges, at fundamental and unsettling levels, some of the core categories of conventional forms of analysis. This contrasts with mainstream (international political economy) scholarship’s framing of human behaviour in terms of faceless, desocialised units of analysis and its reproduction of a model of society as a self-regulating machine explainable by scientific laws adapted from modern philosophy and Newtonian science. It also contrasts with critical scholar- ship’s preference for the Marxist view of economic relations as (pre)determined by the nature of class struggle. While some materialist (feminist) approaches articulate women’s disprivilege as a historical constant and something of a cultural given, discourse analysis of gendered governance, instead, understands privilege, discrimination and inequality as socially, and culturally, produced and variable across time and place, resisting the rooting of economic relations in class relations and showing a greater interest in the gendered cultural practices (including gendered recruitment and promotion practices, discriminatory forms of lending, gendered assessments of credit worthiness and so on) that enable the reproduction of gendered power in the global political economy. A discursive approach to gender and governance necessitates the analysis of norms and standards in the global political economy that many hold to be true, essential and universal, but a committed critique of which reveals as power-laden, regulatory and highly restrictive identity categories (Griffin, 2009: 1). Rather than positing the primacy of ‘the economic’, which swallows whole concepts such as culture, gender, race, production, consumption and representation, this paper looks to the cultural conditions of embodiments of capitalism, specifically neo- liberal global governance and the discourses of governance that neo-liberalism reproduces. To be sure, these discourses emanate from various and diverse actors, institutions, organisations and initiatives, including individual (state) governments and groupings of these (such as the G7 and G10); supra-national bureaucracies such as the European Union (EU); intergovernmental organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the UN; non-governmental organisations such as the World Economic Forum (WEF); and private financial governance initiatives (which are not available for public scrutiny) such as those instituted by the Bank for International Settlements and the International Organization of Securities Commissions. By asking us to confront in quite radical and imaginative ways how we know what we think we know and thus what we exclude from our analyses, a discursive research strategy is always strongly political.

# AT: Afro-Pessimism

### Vulnerability DA

#### Vulnerability DA—the alt fails because it doesn’t cultivate an ethic vulnerability – only the aff can cultivate safe educational spaces that are based in care and respect for each other

Harvester and Blenkinsop 11 Harvester, Lara, and Sean Blenkinsop. "Environmental education and ecofeminist pedagogy: Bridging the environmental and the social." Canadian Journal of Environmental Education (CJEE) 15 (2011): 120-134. rishi

Those advocating for ecofeminist pedagogy emphasize the role of dialogue in enacting new relationships between humans, and between humans and morethan- human nature (Gardner & Riley, 2007; Houde & Bullis, 1999; Li, 2007). Genuine dialogue, according to Buber (1965), is like an embrace, a moment when two come together and, without loss of self, are able to hold each other simultaneously with an open heart and mind. It is built on respect and a deep sense of the intrinsic value of the other being. This is a relation of the both/and, an acknowledgment of the immediate presence of both deep interdependence and the unique autonomy of each being. This is a relationship held together by humility. Blenkinsop (2005) proposes that a teacher who is prepared to engage in dialogue with students will push, support, and challenge students in whatever direction he/she feels will be most helpful for the student, while at the same time acknowledging that students respond out of their own free will. When ecofeminists speak of transformed relationships, they are presupposing that these relationships are based on an acknowledgement of human interdependence with each other and the rest of nature (Merchant, 2005; Warren, 2000). Kheel (1993) suggests that disengaging from patriarchal discourse allows us to hear fuller stories as we listen to nature, hearing voices that have been muted under patriarchy. Ecofeminists seek, in Buber’s language, for authentic dialogue based on respect for, and communion with, other beings. Clearly an ecofeminist pedagogy calls for a radical relational shift in education: a shift towards something that is more dialogical, where the human (teacher and student), the community, and the more-than-human come together and engage with each other in more robust and equitable ways than is currently the norm. This is a pedagogy where learning takes place in a more expanded, including outdoor, environment in which students can experience relationship and build community between themselves, their locale, and the rest of nature. This shift in both the place of education and the definition of and relationship between teacher and learner allows the natural world space to play the more prominent role of active dialoguer, even co-teacher, in an educational practice that is in, for, and through relationship. This notion of authentic dialogue, along with both a growing implicit thread of experiential education, and a critical philosophical stance, are three key components of an ecofeminist pedagogy.

### Alt double bind

#### Double Bind: Either A) The alt doesn’t solve the K because anti-blackness is inevitable within the pessimist frame, and we win because only we have unique offense; or B) The alternative double turns the K because their solvency claim is cruel optimism

Hartman 1997. (Saidiya, Associate prof of English at Cal Berk. *Scenes of Subjection* p. 12-14)

The effort to examine the event of emancipation is no less riddled by inescapable¶ ironies, the foremost of these being the discontinuity between -substantial freedom¶ and legal emancipation. Inevitably one is forced to confront the discrepant legacy of¶ emancipation and the decidedly circumscribed possibilities available to the freed. In¶ short, how does one adequately render the double bind of emancipation-that is,¶ acknowledge the illusory freedom and travestied liberation that succeeded chattel¶ slavery without gainsaying the small triumphs of Jubilee? Certainly one must contend¶ with the enormity of emancipation as both a breach with slavery and a point of¶ transition to what looks more like the reorganization of the plantation system than¶ self-possession, citizenship, or liberty for the "freed." In the place of the grand¶ narrative of freedom, with its decisive events and incontrovertible advances, I offer¶ an account that focuses on the ambivalent legacy of emancipation and the undeniably¶ truncated opportunities available to the freed. Lacking the certitude of a definitive¶ partition between slavery and freedom, and in the absence of a consummate¶ breach through which freedom might unambivalently announce itself, there is at best¶ a transient and fleeting expression of possibility that cannot ensconce itself as a¶ durable temporal marker. If periodization is a barrier imposed from above that¶ obscures the involuntary servitude and legal subjection that followed in the wake of¶ slavery, then attempts to assert absolutist distinctions between slavery and freedom¶ are untenable. Fundamentally, such assertions involve distinctions between the transient¶ and the epochal, underestimate the contradictory inheritance of emancipation¶ and the forms of involuntary servitude that followed in the wake of slavery, and¶ diminish the reign of terror that accompanied the advent of freedom. Put differently,¶ does the momentousness of emancipation as an event ultimately efface the continuities¶ between slavery and freedom and the dispossession inseparable from becoming¶ a "propertied person"? If one dares to "abandon the absurd catalogue of official¶ history," as Edouard Glissant encourages, then the violence and domination perpetuated¶ in the name of slavery's reversal come to the fore. 1• From this vantage¶ point, emancipation seems a double-edged and perhaps obfuscating label. It discloses¶ as well as obscures since involuntary servitude and emancipation were synonymous¶ for a good many of the formerly enslaved. This is evidenced in "commonsense"¶ observations that black lives were more valuable under slavery than under¶ freedom, that blacks were worse off under freedom than during slavery, and that the¶ gift of freedom was a Hhard deaL" I use the tenn "'common sense" purposely to¶ underline what Antonio Gramsci described as the "chaotic aggregate of disparate¶ conceptions" that conform with "the social and cultural position of those masses¶ whose philosophy it is." It is a conception of world and life "implicit to a large¶ extent in determinate strata of society" and "in opposition to 'official' conceptions¶ of the world. " 20 In this case, common sense challenges the official accounts of¶ freedom and stresses the similarities and correspondencies of slavery and freedom.¶ At a minimum, these observations disclose the disavowed transactions between¶ slavery and freedom as modes of production and subjection.¶ The abolition of chattel slavery and the emergence of man, however laudable,¶ long awaited, and cherished, fail to yield such absolute distinctions; instead fleeting,¶ disabled, and short-lived practices stand for freedom and its failure. Everyday practices,¶ rather than traditional political activity like the abolition movement, black¶ conventions, the struggle for suffrage, electoral activities, et cetera, are the focus of¶ my examination because I believe that these pedestrian practices illuminate inchoate¶ and utopian expressions of freedom that are not and perhaps cannot be actualized¶ elsewhere. The desires and longings that exceed the frame of civil rights and¶ political emancipation find expression in quotidian acts labeled "fanciful," "exorbitant,"¶ and "excessive" primarily because they express an understanding or¶ imagination of freedom quite at odds with bourgeois expectations. Paul Gilroy, after¶ Seyla Benhabib, refers to these utopian invocations and the incipient modes of¶ friendship and solidarity they conjure up as "the politics of transfiguration. "21 He¶ notes that in contrast to the politics of fulfillment that operate within the framework¶ of bourgeois civil society and occidental rationality, "the politics of transfiguration¶ strives in pursuit of the sublime, struggling to repeat the unrepeatable, to present the¶ unpresentable. Its rather different hermeneutic focus pushes towards the mimetic,¶ dramatic and performative." From this perspective, stealing away, the breakdown,¶ moving about, pilfering, and other everyday practices that occur below the threshold¶ of formal equality and rights gesture toward an unrealized freedom and emphasize¶ the stranglehold of slavery and the limits of emancipation. In this and in other ways,¶ these practices reveal much about the infrapolitics of the dominated and the contestations¶ over the meaning of abolition and emancipation.

### Turn – Indebtedness

#### Turn – the aff’s investment in the ballot as a recognition of their personhood invokes the logic that a loss signifies the denial of black personhood – this lends the liberal notion that black people are responsible to prove themselves subjects, which in turns places the black in a position of blameworthiness and indebtedness. This legitimizes the commodification of the black body and turns the case

Hartman 1997. (Saidiya, Associate prof of English at Cal Berk. *Scenes of Subjection* p. 125-6)

Emancipation announced the end of chattel slavery; however, it by no¶ means marked the end of bondage. The free(d) individual was nothing if not burdened,¶ responsible, and obligated. Responsibility entailed accounting for one's¶ actions, dutiful suppliance, contractual obligation, and calculated reciprocity. Fundamentally,¶ to be responsible was to be blameworthy. In this respect, the exercise of¶ free will, quite literally, was inextricable from guilty infractions, criminal misdeeds,¶ punishable transgressions, and an elaborate micropenality of everyday life. Responsibility¶ made man an end in himself, and as such, the autonomous and intending agent¶ was above all else culpable. As Friedrich Nietzsche observed: "The proud realization¶ of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the awareness of this rare¶ freedom and power over himself and his destiny, has penetrated him to the depths and¶ become an instinct, his dominant instinct: what will he call his dominant instinct,¶ assuming that he needs a word for it? No doubt about the answer: this sovereign man¶ calls it his conscience.'' 1 In this regard, the burden of conscience attendant to the¶ formation of the sovereign individual was decisive not only in the ways that it¶ facilitated self-disciplining but also in its ability to engender resentment toward and¶ justify the punishment of those who fell below "the threshold of responsibility" or¶ failed to achieve the requisite degree of self-control. 2 The onus of accountability that¶ rested upon the shoulders of the self-responsible individual-the task of proving¶ oneself worthy of freedom-combined with the undue hardships of emancipation¶ engendered an anomalous condition betwixt and between slavery and freedom, for in¶ this case the individual was not only tethered by the bonds of conscience and duty and¶ obliged by the ascetic imperatives of restraint and self-reliance but also literally¶ constrained within a mixed-labor system in which contract was the vehicle of servitude¶ and accountability was inseparable from peonage. Moreover, the guilty volition¶ enjoyed by the free agent bore an uncanny resemblance to the only form of agency¶ legally exercised by the enslaved-that is, criminal liability.¶ Responsibility and restraint all too easily yielded to a condition of involuntary¶ servitude, and culpability. inevitably gave way to indebtedness. The emergence¶ of what I term "indebted servitude" is the subject of this chapter. 1 use the¶ term "indebted servitude" to amplify the constraints of conscience (discipline internalized¶ and lauded as a virtue), the coercion and compulsion of the free labor¶ system, and the ''grafting of morality onto economics'' in the making of the dutiful¶ free laborer and similarly lo illuminate the elasticity of debt in effecting peonage and¶ other forms of involuntary servitude.' According to Nietzsche, the feelings of guilt,¶ obligation, and responsibility originated in the relations~ip of creditor and debtor;¶ moreover, debt as the measure of morality sanctions the 'imposition of punishment;¶ debt serves to reinscribe both servitude and the pained constitution of blackness. 4 A¶ telling example of this calculation of conscience or the entanglement of debt and¶ duty can be found in Jared Bell Waterbury's Advice to a Young Christian. Here the¶ duty of self-examination is compared to bookkeeping: "Let the duty [of selfexamination]¶ be duly and thoroughly performed, and we rise to the standard of the¶ skilful fsicJ and prudent merchant, who duly records every ilem of business; who¶ never closes his counting-house until his balance sheet is made up~ and who, by a¶ single reference, can tell the true state of his accounts, and form a correct esti1nate of¶ his co1nmercial standing. "5 In the case of the freed, the cultivation of conscience¶ operated in the whip's stead as an overseer of the soul, although the use of compulsion¶ was routinely employed against those seemingly remiss in their duties. As it¶ turned out, the encumbrance of freedom made one not only blameworthy and vulnerable¶ to hardship and affliction in the name of interest but also, surprisingly, no¶ less susceptible to the correctives of coercion and constraint.

### Ballot Turn

#### Turn – the ballot is offered to the judge to take pleasure in the suffering of the black body. The investment in the ballot is dependent on the notion of the black body as fungible – makes anti-blackness worse

Hartman 1997. (Saidiya, Associate prof of English at Cal Berk. *Scenes of Subjection* p. 25-6)

Rankin was not alone in his desire to slip into blackness and experience the¶ suffering of slavery "firsthand," so to speak. On the contrary, the popularity of¶ Uncle Tom's Cabin and The Octoroon indicates the willingness of others to suffer,¶ too. The elasticity of blackness and its capacious affects enabled such flights and¶ becomings. Moreover, in this case, the figurative capacities of blackness and the¶ fungibility of the commodity are directly linked. The fungibility of the commodity,¶ specifically its abstractness and immateriality, enabled the black body or blackface¶ mask to serve as the vehicle of white self-exploration, renunciation, and enjoyment.¶ 22 Therefore, the ability to put on blackness must be considered in the context¶ of chattel slavery and the economy of enjoyment founded thereupon. Antebellum ·¶ formations of pleasure, even those of the North, need to be considered in relation to¶ the affective dimensions of chattel slavery since enjoyment is virtually unimaginable¶ without recourse to the black body and the subjection of the captive, the diversions¶ engendered by the dispossession of the enslaved, or the fantasies launched by the¶ myriad uses of the black body. For this reason the formal features of this economy of¶ pleasure and the politics of enjoyment are considered in regard to the literal and¶ figurative occupation and possession of the body. This reading attempts to elucidate¶ the means by which the wanton use of and the violence directed toward the black¶ body come to be identified as its pleasure and dangers-that is, the expectations of¶ slave property are ontologized as the innate capacities and inner feelings of the¶ enslaved, and moreover, the ascription of excess and enjoyment to the African¶ effaces the violence perpetrated against the enslaved. In light of these issues, the¶ schematic analysis of minstrelsy and melodrama that follows focuses on the convergence¶ of violence and pleasure, which is identified as one of the primary attributes of¶ this economy of enjoyment, rather than providing a close reading of the texts of¶ minstrelsy and melodrama. Scant attention is paid to the white spectator's identification¶ with blackface characters. Instead, the major issue explored is the relation¶ between pleasure and violence-that is, the facility of blackness in the other's self-fashioning¶ and the role of pleasure in securing the mechanisms of racial subjection.¶ In other words, this economy of enjoyment is interrogated through a consideration¶ of the dynamics of possession and close scrutiny of the object of property and its¶ uses.

### Turn – Intersectionality

#### Afro-pessimism as a totalizing theory cedes potential for radical surrender to intersectionality which is key for black feminist praxis

Nash 19, (Jennifer C. Nash, *Black Feminism Reimagined: After Intersectionality*, 2019, Jennifer C. Nash is Associate Professor of African American Studies and Gender and Sexuality Studies at Northwestern University)GP

In this chapter, I imagine a black feminist theoretical and political project that could surrender its territorial hold to intersectionality and permit the analytic to move untethered from the imagined specificity of black woman. My understanding of surrender is indebted to Kevin Quashie’s work on black interiority, which complicates the prevailing notion that surrender is “a passive term, the counterpart to being conquered, dominated, or defeated.”8 Instead, Quashie argues that surrender can be “expressive and active,” “a deliberate giving up to another, the simultaneous practice of yielding and falling toward what is deeply and largely unknowable.”9 Drawing on Quashie, I treat a black feminist surrender of intersectionality not as a form of “defeat” but as the beginning of reimagining black feminist theoretical and political life, as a deep act of generosity that unleashes connections between black feminism and women of color feminism, enabling black feminism to imagine itself otherwise. Indeed, this chapter endeavors to energize a black feminist politics of surrender by asking what if we surrendered the notion that black woman is intersectionality’s key sign? What if we insistently despecified intersectionality? What if we embraced a vision of intersectionality that was capacious enough to center women of color generally and that insisted on the intimacies between transnationalism and intersectionality in terms of both their construction and use by women’s studies and their creative world-making possibilities? What if intersectionality could be mobilized to theorize arrangements of power beyond US black woman, and thus as a generative space of intimacy among women of color? In other words, I treat a despecified intersectionality, one that does not necessarily reference black woman, as a critical response to how women’s studies has imagined both intersectionality and transnationalism, and as an opportunity for black feminists to imagine a kind of intimacy with both transnationalism and the broader category “women of color.” This form of letting go, effectively ceding a proprietary relationship with intersectionality, allows for new forms of intimacy, allegiance, and alliance and promotes a form of black feminist agency that is far from the defensive posture I trace in the first half of the book.

### Perm

#### Perm 1 – Do the aff and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

#### Perm 2 – Do the aff and resist anti-blackness. We will win a link turn that the affirmative makes the material conditions of anti-blackness better. Endorse the aff and other practices that aim to chip away at the structure of anti-blackness

#### Double bind: either the alternative solves anti-blackness, and we will win perm 1 because the aff is consistent; or the alternative doesn’t solve anti-blackness, and we will win perm #2 is a better way to tackle both aff and neg impacts

#### Prefer the perm: Systems of power are interlocking… and forcing competition between the aff and the alt links to white masculine rationality

**Collins, 1990**. (Patricia Hill Collins, Associate Professor of African American Studies, University of Cincinnati, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment, 1990, p. 225)

Additive models of oppression are firmly rooted in the either/or dichotomous thinking of Eurocentric, masculinist thought. One must be either Black or white in such thought systems – persons of ambiguous racial and ethnic identity constantly battle with questions such as “what are you, anyway?” This emphasis on quantification and categorization occurs in conjunction with the belief that either/or categories must be ranked. The search for certainty of this sort requires that one side of a dichotomy be privileged while its other is denigrated. Privilege becomes defined in relation to its other. Replacing additive models of oppression with interlocking ones creates possibilities for new paradigms. The significance of seeing race, class, and gender as interlocking systems of oppression is that such an approach fosters a paradigmatic shift of thinking inclusively about other oppressions, such as age, sexual orientation, religion, and ethnicity. Race, class and gender represent the three systems of oppression that most heavily affect African-American women. But these systems and the economic, political, and ideological conditions that support them may not be the most fundamental oppressions, and they certainly affect many more groups than Black women. Other people of color, Jews, the poor, white women, and gays and lesbians have all had similar ideological justifications offered for their subordination. All categories of humans labeled Others have been equated to one another, to animals, and to nature (Halpin 1989). Placing African-American women and other excluded groups in the center of analysis opens up possibilities for a both/and conceptual stance, one in which all groups possess varying amounts of penalty and privilege in one historically created system. In this system, for example, white women are penalized by their gender but privileged by their race. Depending upon the context, an individual may be an oppressor, a member of an oppressed group, or simultaneously oppressor and oppressed.

### Perm – Intersectionality

#### Perm – we must join struggles together against the patriarchy in an intersectional lens in order to advocate for women who are often excluded from feminist conversations

Lorde 80 (Audre Lorde, American writer, feminist, radical feminist, womanist, librarian, and civil rights activist. Black lesbian writer who addressed injustices such as racism, sexism, classism and homophobia through her works. “Age, Race, Class and Sex: Women Redefining Difference”)

But our future survival is predicated upon our ability to relate within equality. As women, we must root out internalized patterns of oppression within ourselves if we are to move beyond the most supercial aspects of social change. Now we must recognize dierences among women who are our equals, neither inferior nor superior, and devise ways to use each others’ dierence to enrich our visions and our joint struggles.

The future of our earth may depend upon the ability of all women to identify and develop new denitions of power and new patterns of relating across dierence. The old denitions have not served us, nor the earth that supports us. The old patterns, no matter how cleverly rearranged to imitate progress, still condemn us to cosmetically altered repetitions of the same old exchanges, the same old guilt, hatred, recrimination, lamentation, and suspicion.

# AT: Baudrillard

### Feminism DA

#### Baudrillard destroys feminist projects

Ebert 5 (Teresa, Professor of Humanities at the College of Arts and Sciences at the University at Albany who specializes in Critical and Cultural Theory, Feminist Critique, Marxist Theory and Globalization Theory, “Rematerializing Feminism” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40404228.pdf>) //Don Markos

Beyond the "End of Ideology " In postmodern social theory, especially in the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, ideology is seen as undergoing a "break." In their writings, Laclau and Mouffe, through a heavy reliance on Lacan and Althusser, have erased the materialist theory of ideology articulated in Marx and Engels' The German Ideology and more em- phatically reiterated in Marx's own Capital In order to dramatize the break, they have reduced the classical Marxist theory of ideology to a simple "false consciousness" and with great fanfare have represented Althusserian and post-Althusserian views as groundbreaking concep- tual feats. Ideology after this "break" has become a generalized rep resentation from which no one can escape and in which everyone is condemned to live their social being. One of the consequences of this notion of ideology, of course, has been its erasure of the rigid clarity of class antagonisms and any other binaries (such as true/false, powerful/powerless, exploitative/emancipatory) . This paradox - that in a world in which ideology is one of the fundamental axes of identity and social processes, intellectuals have declared it ended - is caused by the fact that the regime of social relations of production, which the Marxist tradition has explained by the concept of ideology, has not only not ended but instead has intensified its hold on the subject. The most effective way to disentangle the contemporary impasse on ideology is to re-understand the materialist theory of ideology. Ideology has a very specific and materialist meaning in the Marxist tradition, especially in Marx's Capital (in which, curiously, it has be- come common to say that the notion of ideology was abandoned by Marx). In various chapters of Capital (especially chapters 1, 6, 9, 10, 1 1 and 12), Marx explains the process by which the worker exchanges his/her labor-power for wages. In chapter ten he explains the pre- cise mechanism of the working day, during which the worker pro- duces the equivalent of his wages and also surplus labor. In chapter six he theorizes the difference between labor and labor-power and concludes that labor-power is that particular "commodity whose use- value possess the peculiar property of being a source of value, whose actual consumption is therefore itself an objectification of labor, hence a creation of value" (1977, 270). The exchange, he concludes, between the capitalist and the worker is an exchange of labor-power for wages. This exchange is represented in bourgeois theory as a free, unfettered and equal exchange. In fact, at the end of chapter six, Marx makes a point of dwelling on this "free-trader vulgaris" view of the exchange of wages for labor-power; he concludes that it is anything but an equal exchange - it leaves the worker, Marx notes, "like some- one who has brought his own hide to market and now has nothing else to expect but - a tanning" (1977, 280). The historical materialist concept of ideology seeks to account for the representations of this exchange as an equal and fair ex- change. This, I want to emphasize, is the core of the materialist theory of ideology: how the relation between wage-labor and capital is rep- resented as free and equal when it is anything but (it is "a tanning") . False consciousness (the bête noir of postmodern theories of ideology) is a "struggle concept" (to adopt Maria Mies' term) by which a mate- rialist understanding marks the consciousness that regards this ex- change to be an exchange among equals and conducted in freedom. It is a false consciousness, because it is seen as unfettered and un- coerced when, in fact, as Marx himself argues, this exchange takes place under "the silent compulsion of economic relations" - a com- pulsion that "sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker" (Marx, 1977, 899). False consciousness is the conscious- ness that misrecognizes the compulsion of economic relations as free and therefore accepts the exchange of wages for labor-power as equal. Even a quick look at the post-Althusserian theories of ideology will make clear that, far from being groundbreaking theories, the postmodern notion of ideology is simply an erasure of the material- ist theory of ideology and a marginalization of the role of labor. It ends up essentially legitimizing the relation between wage-labor and capital. To say, as postmodern theories of ideology say over and over again, that there is no space outside ideology is to say that it is impos- sible to mark any relation as a relation of inequality. Because to say that the exchange of wages for labor-power is unequal, according to postmodern theory, is to set up a "true" {i.e., "equal") relation. This is "wrong," according to postmodern theory, because it establishes a binary in which a truthful relation masters a false relation. But this is exactly what happens under capitalism. The relation between wage- labor and capital is an unequal relation, and to simply say that draw- ing attention to its inequality is to fall into binaries is to substitute bourgeois epistemology for social justice. Ideology is not epistemol- ogy: to try to make ideology part of epistemology and then decon- struct it through a maneuver in which right and wrong, correct and incorrect, truthful and untruthful are pitted against each other is to simply relegitimate capitalist relations. The crisis we are witnessing now in the theory of ideology is the crisis of this legitimization of an unjust relation in the discourses of intellectuals who, in their formal theories, declare themselves to be anti-capitalist and friends of the people.

### Vulnerability DA

**Vulnerability DA--Neoliberalism depends on the narcissistic fantasy of mastery that disavows vulnerability as dependence—alt reproduces neoliberalism without the aff**

**Layton 14** Lynne Layton, Massachusetts Institute for Psychoanalysis and Editor, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 253 Mason Terrace, Brookline, MA, 02446, USA. E-mail:[layton@rcn.com](mailto:layton@rcn.com)“Some psychic effects of neoliberalism: Narcissism, disavowal, perversion” Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2014) 19, 161–178. doi:10.1057/pcs.2014.5; published online 15 May 2014 rishi

**It is a hallmark of US neoliberal political life that the more people are rendered vulnerable and dispensable, the more the state of vulnerability becomes figured as shameful**. As many have noted (see, for example, [Centeno and Cohen, 2012](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib19)), **increased income inequality has led the privileged to rationalize their privilege, which in turn has led to decreasing empathy for the poor**. [Lamont (2000)](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib51), who interviewed white and black working-class men in New York in the 90s, found that **neoliberal economic realities and the decline of traditional collective sources of solidarity had rendered white working-class men quite vulnerable**. **One way they dealt with their heightened feelings of vulnerability was to draw boundaries between the deserving and the undeserving poor, the latter of whom they associated with blackness** (see also [Wacquant, 2001b](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib85)). Indeed, by the 90s in the US, **the white imaginary offered two predominant socially reviled subject positions to poor African Americans**: the omnipotent male criminal, who terrorizes vulnerable whites with his nefarious entrepreneurial skills, and his split-off other side, the female welfare dependent, who, since Reagan, has held all of the country’s disavowed need and has been used as a signifier of the failures of big government. As I shall argue, **a typical form of splitting endemic to neoliberal practices and ideologies pits omnipotent narcissistic versions of autonomy against degraded narcissistic versions of dependence. This instance of a racist white imaginary well exemplifies how a radical split between autonomy and dependence can be projected seamlessly onto a racialized and gendered divide.**

**Breaking the fantasy of mastery with an affirmation of vulnerability is critical to overcoming neoliberal subjectivity**

**Layton 14** Lynne Layton, Massachusetts Institute for Psychoanalysis and Editor, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 253 Mason Terrace, Brookline, MA, 02446, USA. E-mail:[layton@rcn.com](mailto:layton@rcn.com)“Some psychic effects of neoliberalism: Narcissism, disavowal, perversion” Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2014) 19, 161–178. doi:10.1057/pcs.2014.5; published online 15 May 2014 rishi

As noted earlier, [Binkley (2009](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib9), [2011a](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib10), [2011b](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib11), [2014](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib12)) and other non-psychoanalytic thinkers focus on neoliberal subjective practices that demand a shift from comfort with dependence to repudiation of dependence. In a psychoanalytic frame, however, which recognizes no possibility of overcoming dependence**, the task is to comprehend the psychic effects of a cultural lack of attunement to dependency needs and a cultural encouragement to split off and project dependency needs and vulnerability**. Such **effects**, as we have seen, **include intense shame about dependence** (see [Jimenez and Walkerdine, 2012](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib43)), **omnipotent versions of autonomy, and narcissistic processes that include oscillations between grandiosity and self-deprecation with regard to the self, and idealization and devaluation with regard to the relation with others**. **These narcissistic states and oscillations are motored by the fantasies subtending the fetish structure of a perverse society that disavows a reality marked by gross failures of accountability and proper caretaking by those in authority** ([Layton, 2010](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib58)). T**he fantasies endemic to narcissistic neoliberal subject formation are produced in part by the radical split between autonomy and connection described earlier** (and enacted differently by different groups): in the autonomy fantasy, we imagine ourselves self-sufficient and omnipotent, needing no one (the entrepreneurial self**); in the fantasy marked by neoliberalism’s degraded state of dependency, we fantasize that we will be loved and taken care of without having to make any effort**. [Chang and Glynos (2011)](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib20) and [Glynos (2014a](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html" \l "bib33), [2014b](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib34)) have well elaborated the ways that **overinvestment in these fantasy logics operates in contemporary UK political culture, issuing in oscillations between policies that reproduce dependency and policies that punish dependency.**

### Alt Fails

**Baudrillard’s theory cannot distinguish between the productive politics of the aff and the mass snooze of commodification—the affirmative disproves the simulation thesis by producing content that ruptures and interrupts the droning message of the war on terror.**

**Rojek 1993** (Chris, Senior Editor in Sociology at Routledge *Forget Baudrillard?* P. 120

Yet **to imply that poetry excludes politics is surely eccentric** **Observing and communicating cannot be satisfactorily understood as unchanging constants. There is an historical dimension to them**, as unchanging constants. There is an historical dimension to them. **Baudrillard’s sociology is fatally immune to this because it is bluntly ahistorical. So it ignores how observing and communicating have changed and minimizes the stratified difference sbetween communicators and observers. Baudrillard correctly stresses that the distraction factories of the gflobal communications industry confuyse our sense of change and our awareness of difference. But the minimalist picture of humans as ‘monitroing screens’ or ‘terminals in mass communication networks’ which his sociloygy supplies is an unsuitable answer to this confusion. It does not even take seriously the circulation processes which his work identifies. For circulation involves not only repetition but also reaction**. Benjamin’s sociology allows for reaction. His discussion of mass reproduction and the global circulation of images, bodies and commodities **does not negate a political response; on the contrary it demands one. The decline of aura, the homogenization of culture and the manipulation of the masses are all things which Benjamin opposes. There may be a note of melancholy in his assessment of the prospects for successfully opposing these historical tendencies but he does not waver in his commitment to struggle and resistance. In contrast, Bduarillard discusses mass reproduction , homogenization, and manipulation as immoveable facts of life. One relates ot them through irony, play, seduyction and movement. Commitment in Baudrillard’s aleatory, reversible universe is always a sign of stuborrness. It closes down one’s range of response to the isness of hyperreality**.

### Turn – Overdeterminism

**There is no all-encompassing system of value that makes everything people do the capitalisms—your impact claims are overdetermined and vague—the affirmative’s creation of new codes is an effective form of politics.**

**MacCannell and MacCannell 1993** (Dean and Juliet, Sociology and English professors respectively at UC-Irvine, *Forget Baudrillard?* p. 141-143)

We are suggesting that **Baudrillard took his analysis of the simula- crum up to the site of the new forms of capitalist exploitation** that have introjected class structure into postmodernity. **But he did not name the new sites of exploitation or initiate critical examination of them. His failure in this regard places his work at great risk**. Historically it may contribute as much to the new forms of exploita- tion and their cover-up as to their exposure and eventual overthrow. He cannot 'read' or 'see' Mickey Mouse because Mickey stands in precisely the same relation to code creation as Baudrillard's theory taken in its entirety. Ultimately, both **Baudrillard** and Mickey Mouse **insist on a generalized sense of the possible existence not of codes, which would be subversive, but of The Code, a single frame- work, already in existence, for everything**. The Code, and correla- tively the pretence of the absence of need for any new code, **is the only field for the putative free play of simulacra, or the appearance of a figure** of lack **which can be universally worshipped**. **If there were a code, it truly would accommodate human life to the impos- sible, to death, to ultimate pleasure, to the real. I f there were a code it would be equally and freely available to all human beings**. Group, class, status, category, would disappear or be rendered insignificant**. No wonder it is fervently desired by the prematurely utopian adherents of every political position**. It would be stable and open to all for all time until the radical end of time that is supposed to be the Last Judgement.¶ Postmodernity affirms the possibility of The Code in the form of¶ pure repetition, the simulacrum, and the 'random cannibalization of styles of the past', as Jameson put it. But postmodern capitalism is also committed to apparent diversity of consumer goods within the framework of a single Code, a commitment that produces a certain tension if not a contradiction and dialectic. Apparent diversity is achieved by the marketing of diverse codes the source and origin of which are officially unrecognized and repressed.¶ We suggest that what is being exploited by postmodern capital- ism are the codes of those in the starkest of human situations, who have confronted 'the worst' most radically in their 'lifestyles' (=codes) or modes of relating to death and fulfilment. **What is most successfully 'marketed' today are simulacra of whole ways of existing, adaptations of 'gang youth', punks, 'primitive' Brazilian Indians** (At Play in the Fields of the Lord), homeless people, bag ladies, hookers, war victims, AIDS sufferers (the list is extended daily), their codes, the means they have worked out for dealing with the worst. We further suggest that Lacan was correct in his assertion that the 'panic' of the drive has displaced the Symbolic of¶ desire for the contemporary or postmodern subject. There is no more 'needs fulfilment' in postmodernity. Capitalism, driven beyond its capacity to provide, has seen to that. **All that it can promise us now is an endless series of futile attempts to accommo- date that which carmot be accommodated: the satisfied need, ultimate jouissance, death**. Its radical failure of symbolization leaves its believers 'eyeball to eyeball' with The Real. Postmodern capitalism is the realm of 'enjoyment', where the human subject is commanded 'to enjoy' but carmot, where pleasure that cannot be experienced spills over into The Thing, where our 'things' obscenely and menacingly enjoy themselves at our expense.¶ But there are those among us who deal directly with the absolute- ness of loss, those who know there is no substitutability, no itera- bility, no supplement. They have carved out an existence on the empty gound between the possibility of the symbolization of desire and the dream of a single Symbolic-Paternal Order. They are the only possible source of a critical viewpoint on postmodern capital- ism and of the creative energy needed to move it. **We are disappointed with Baudrillard for not having found the site of post- modern exploitation, for giving us instead nostalgia for the medieval Church in the form of the now commonplace postmodern assertion of its absence**. But if **Baudrillard** spends all his time with¶ commodities-as-simulacra, with God as simulacrum, with things that can have no relation to need, there must be a reason for it. He **is avoiding the ground that has been departed by the cause of desire, the ground where new codes are created as a matter of necessity**. This is the reason he did not find Mickey Mouse. Mickey is there on the ground of departed desire as a defender of its borders, to block those who have not entered and to cover up the creative adaptations of those who have. Mickey permits us to imagine that there is a universal code of which he is the emanation and emissary, while his owners, if not his animators, know there are as many codes - ripe for the plucking - as there are human groupings. What Mickey does not permit us to imagine is his code: that his head, with the two ears that never change their location or position, that his head is not only the maternal breast and the castrated balls, but a motion picture projector. What this Mickey- projector reproduces is not a universal code for iteration as has been claimed. It is rather a faithful reproduction of the absolute loss human life is based upon; of the theft of its creativity, its reduction, and abject resignation in the face of The Real.

### AT: Grace

#### Victoria Grace is transphobic—their link/answer is just another reason to vote for us.

**Guignion 21** (David, University of Western Ontario, The Journal of Media Art Study and Theory Volume 2, Issue 1, 2021)

Grace combines her criticism of these two approaches to question if trans identities are “a transgressive force that destabilizes and challenges the gender binary” (117). Drawing upon the influential work of Sandy Stone, Susan Stryker, and Judith Halberstam (to name just a few), who have made significant contributions to the trans theory, each contributing specifically to the way that trans people are (pre)figured within the dominant matrix of cisgender and hetero-normative social relations that permeate today, Grace employs Baudrillard’s work to downplay these “transgenderist” beliefs that “reflect uncritically precisely what is happening with the simulation of gender, and accord almost perfectly with the contemporary hegemonic structuration” (121). The violence of Grace’s suggestion is striking for three primary reasons. Firstly, it positions trans identities as simply a means to transgress power relations when, for many—if not all—trans people, their identity as trans portends any political affiliation. Trans people are not trans people to make a political statement. Secondly, the disavowal of trans people’s identities as only participating in the hegemonic configuration of gender (as either anatomy as destiny or performative as destiny) ignores the fact that for many trans people their identities are a way by which they may continue to survive in the world. In other words, by framing their existence as a ‘failure’ to ostensibly challenge hyperreality, it extends the familiar oppressive discourses that shroud their daily lives. And thirdly, it is incredibly ironic for her to employ Baudrillard, a cis-gender man, as the authority on what constitutes appropriate, or properly political, identities.

# AT: Framework

### AT: TVA - Trade off DA

#### Centering debates on specific operational aspects of military policy trades off with analyses of cultural constructs that justify the use of force – their model of debate doesn’t challenge militarism

Levy 15 Levy, Yagil. Prof. Yagil Levy. Department of Sociology, Political Science and Communication at Open University of Israel "What is Controlled by Civilian Control of the Military? Control of the Military vs. Control of Militarization." Armed Forces & Society (2015): 0095327X14567918. rishi

What is controlled by civilian control of the military? One might think that effective civilian control restrains the use of force. However, that is not always the case. On the contrary, a glance at developments in civil–military relations during the post– Cold War period shows that while civilian control has been tightened in many democracies, militarization also increased. Militarism is defined as an approach that regards war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity.1 Militarization is therefore a process through which militarism increases while demilitarization signifies a decline in this propensity. As an illustration, in the United States, as the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate, militarization with an increased propensity to use force2 thrived in an era of increased political scrutiny of the military.3 In Israel, civilian control has been enhanced since the 1970s, leading to an overly subordinate military whose professional autonomy has been impaired,4 while the government has enjoyed more legitimacy to launch offensive campaigns in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.5 In Russia, during Putin’s rule, the military’s subversive behavior toward elected politicians has been moderated and its freedom of action restricted,6 however, militarization in terms of patriotic education,7 and the inflation of external threats8 has flourished. Thus, increased civilian control of the military may be coupled with militarization, although not necessarily. This case raises the need for two scholarly investigations. The first, which I will leave unexplored, is the extent to which there is a causal link between civilian control and militarization. The second, and the focus of this article, is the extent to which control of the military should be distinguished from the mechanisms controlling the use of force, an underdeveloped aspect in the study of civil–military relations, as I explain in greater detail subsequently. I argue that a distinction should be made between two modes of civilian control over military affairs: control of the military and control of militarization. Control of the military, the main focus of students of civilian control, concerns itself primarily with the military organization, particularly the operational aspects of the military’s performance (doctrine, deployment, resources, etc.) and their expected political implications. In contrast, the control of militarization deals with controlling the mechanisms that legitimize the use of force, first and foremost military force. It draws on political discourse, seeking to guarantee that the use of force follows a thorough, open, and deliberative process of decision making in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role in addressing the legitimacy to use. The encounter between the modes of control yields several possible results. It follows that this article is an analytically motivated study rather an empirically motivated one. My aim is to develop a theory that distinguishes between the control of the military and the control of militarization and propositions regarding the encounter between the two modes of control. These propositions can be viewed as hypotheses that set the stage for future empirical inquiry.9 The first section presents the gap in the literature, leading, in the second section, to a revised conceptualization of civilian control. In the third section, I analyze the relationship between the modes of control. The Theoretical Gap Scholars disagree whether civilian control of the armed forces is positively correlated with the reduction in the use of force. Lasswell argued for such a positive correlation. In his classic ‘‘garrison state’’ theme, he expressed concern that the empowerment of the military establishment in reaction to an external threat would undermine civil–military relations by letting the officers, as ‘‘specialists in violence,’’ run the state and impose their warlike inclinations on politics.10 Choi and James validated this concern statistically by concluding that as the influence of the military increases, the likelihood that the state will be involved in a military dispute becomes greater.11 Similarly, Snyder echoed the Lasswellian view by claiming that the offensive bias is exacerbated when civilian control is weak, and this bias grows more extreme when the military leverages the operational doctrine to improve its position in civil–military disputes.12 Sechser linked civilian control with the use of force by suggesting that the cautious nature of military officers may be a consequence of strong civilian control.13 Officers are concerned that a strong civilian leadership will punish them for botched military adventures. Mills went even further by arguing that there is no prospect for peace without a monopolistic control of violence, an approach that strongly links control with the restraint of force.14 In a different manner, students of militarism such as Bacevich,15 Mann,16 and Shaw17 implicitly recognized that the restraint of the military may take place within a militaristic mind-set. At the extreme, as Mann asserted with regard to the post– Cold War expansionist trends of the United States, ‘‘the notion of civilian control of the military became meaningless, since civilians were the leading militarists’’.18 It follows that civilian control may not reduce the proclivity to use force. Recognizing that militaristic pressures can come from civilian origins, other scholars even assume that officers may be less war-prone than politicians. Huntington famously contended that the military is more conservative than civilians regarding the propensity to use force, largely due to organizational cautiousness.19 Similarly, Betts concluded that military leaders rarely recommend the use of force, and their advice is more influential when counseling against military intervention.20 Along these lines, Feaver and Gelpi showed that militarily inexperienced leaders in the United States, more than militarily experienced ones, extended the use of force to deal with interstate conflicts that did not present a substantial threat to national security. 21 Desch acknowledged that, ‘‘the most prevalent civil-military relations problem of the post-Vietnam era has not been keeping the dogs of war on the leash, but rather getting them off of it’’.22 In other words, civilians may be more warprone than the military.23 It follows that civilian control may even promote the use of force when war-prone civilians successfully mobilize the society for war and even push the reluctant military to battle.24 Therefore, effective civilian control can rein in the military but not the use of force. Here, therefore, is the gap in the literature. Students of militarism do not link the propensity to use force to the broader issue of what type of civilian control may restrain the use of force, aside from the cultural process of demilitarization. Furthermore, students of militarism have not extended the theme of civilian control from controlling the military to controlling the civilian institutions that legitimize the use of force. Similarly, even students of civilian control who acknowledge that civilian control and military restraint do not necessarily go hand in hand have not questioned the extent to which we should decouple the two different processes as different modes of control rather than different effects of control. In other words, they have not scrutinized the mechanisms legitimizing the use of force decoupled from the mechanisms monitoring the armed forces. Given this gap in the literature, in the following section I present a revised conceptualization of civilian control by introducing the distinction between control of the military and control of militarization. Two Modes of Control Control of the Military A distinction should be made between control of the military and control of militarization. Control of the military refers to the extent to which the citizenry, through civilian state institutions, sets limits on the freedom of action of the military in the areas of activity that have political implications, such as military doctrine and policies, operational plans, weapons systems, organization, recruitment, and promotion of officers. Such limits correspond with political objectives and the resources required to attain those goals that civilians (in a democracy, popularly elected civilians) shape autonomously. These goals are regarded as expressing the will of society as a whole. The military, in turn, abides by these civilian directives.25 To a large extent, relations of exchange are formed, in which the military subordinates itself to civilian rulers in exchange for the resources (material and symbolic) that the state possesses and provides to the military.26 It follows that control of the military should be broadly conceptualized and should not be limited to the relations between elected civilians and generals. Viewed in this vein, although authoritarian regimes effectively control their militaries (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are good examples), control of the military is deficient without the engagement of the citizenry. Control over the military operates mainly through institutional mechanisms that have an effect on the manner in which policy makers activate the military. In addition to the monitoring of the military by elected civilians, collective actors working outside the formal institutions, mainly social movements and interest groups, often affect institutional policy making through lobbying, protests, court appeals, and the media. Ultimately, what is important is not whether the troops are deployed to fight or remain in their barracks but the political process that leads to the decision about the deployment, pertaining to the broader political implication of military activity as presented earlier. As a highly developed theme, control of the military is not the focus of this article but control of militarization and its relationship with the control of the military is. Control of Militarization While the control of the military is aimed at controlling the organization and its supervisors, the control of militarization is concerned with controlling the mechanisms for legitimizing the use of force. Drawing on Burk’s ‘‘way of war,’’27 Johnston’s ‘‘strategic culture,’’28 Mann’s ‘‘militarism,’’29 and Beetham’s ‘‘political legitimacy,’’30 the legitimacy to use force relates to the extent to which the state’s legal mode of using armed force against an external adversary is socially accepted as a normal, pervasive, and enduring strategic preference. Such legitimacy encompasses social beliefs about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses, and the efficacy of the use of force. Legitimacy can be evaluated along a spectrum whose most extreme pole at one end is pacifism. Pacifism opposes the use of force to resolve international disputes. In the middle of the spectrum, the use of force is legitimized when it is instrumental in defending what is perceived as the nation’s security. The other extreme pole is militarism, meaning that the legitimacy for using force is unquestionable or barely questionable. Militarism ranges from regarding the use of force and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity,31 an approach that typifies many industrialized democracies (and therefore is the definition used in this article), to an irrational value system that espouses war as a goal in itself.32 The degree of this legitimacy can be determined by monitoring public opinion and political debates. However, public and elite opinion and rhetoric can be more deeply analyzed as a multilayered structure, which reflects deeper cultural constructs that are less easily detectable. Focusing on the level of legitimacy for using force moves beyond the narrow focus on the military’s institutions, influence, and resources, and the attitude toward the use of force to address militarized political cultures that are often generated outside of the military. Assuming that militarism is a socially and politically driven phenomenon, the military is not necessarily the most salient part of the political culture nurturing militarism. When it is more restrained than warmongering politicians, the influence of the military does not result in militarization. Hence, an exclusive focus on the military may be misleading. The control of militarization involves the political discourse in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role. This discourse aimed at subjecting the elected civilians’ use of force to a deliberative process that takes place within the public and political arenas and addresses the legitimacy to use force. Several conditions promote this deliberative process: 1. Relative slowness in decision making to guarantee that decisions are made through argumentation in which everyone’s opinion is in principle equally valuable and equally fallible. As Huysmans held, such deliberation takes time and can always be questioned again. Thus, speedy decision making in response to a perceived threat thwarts this principle, strengthens the executive branch of government, and suppresses dissent.33 2. Debates should not be confined to the operational aspects of military policies but should extend to the broader logic behind and rightness of such policies. In other words, the debates should focus on the very legitimacy for using force and its utility in promoting the public good.34 Thus, the focus is on affecting the political cultures legitimizing the use of force, rather than taking this legitimacy for granted. Therefore, during the debates there should be a thorough consideration of nonlethal or less belligerent policy alternatives. 3. Access to information is not obstructed by manipulation, such as threat inflation.35 4. Relatedly, debates should be conducted through an open discourse in which the dominant discourse does not hinder the political opposition from challenging decision makers.36 Such a dominant discourse often takes the form of asserting the need for unity in times of crisis, thereby muting dissenting voices.37 By extension, challenging the decision makers should also challenge the power relations in society that affect the legitimacy of using force and may create barriers to deliberation. In general, deliberation alone does not necessarily ensure a more democratic outcome unless actors have other power resources as well, such as the ability to mobilize to overcome entrenched interests.38 This is why free and fair elections, along with constitutional mechanisms such as checks on the power of each branch of government, equality under the law and impartial courts, are preconditions for the deliberative process.39

### Metaphorical Analysis Key

#### Political deliberation is based more on how metaphors animate policy than rational choices

Heidt 13 Heidt, Stephen J. Department of Communication, Georgia State University. "Presidential Rhetoric, Metaphor, and the Emergence of the Democracy Promotion Industry." Southern Communication Journal 78.3 (2013): 233-255. rishi

Presidential rhetoric always ignores policy details partially because presidents don’t like to speak in specifics, but also partially because metaphoric appeals are easier to extend. Presidents turn to metaphor because they recognize the power of metaphor, the ability of metaphor to connect complicated public policy proposals to broader themes and representations of America, and the difficulty opponents have in countering metaphorical depictions of public policy. In this way, public decision making is premised not on the evaluation of specific policies but instead on the assessment of the archetypal metaphors utilized by advocates and the ability of those metaphors to animate empty, incomplete, or poorly defined policy agendas. The danger reflected by this analysis is that the use of metaphor to extend public policy pushes an ultimately uncritical perspective, one that asks audiences to accept the policy not on its merits but on its relationship to generalized conceptions of the human experience. The danger of uncritical acceptance is such that, over time, advocates and publics come to believe their characterizations of international situations, the necessity and inevitability of democracy, and the U.S. role as benevolent assistant. These rhetorical processes allow for the appropriation and use of policy by those less interested in the ideals that serve as the genesis for the policy and instead desire to redirect the policy toward their own ends. This is precisely what occurred during the George W. Bush administration, leading one expert to fear that ‘‘the close association of democracy promotion both with the war in Iraq . . . and with the War on Terrorism . . . has badly hurt the legitimacy of democracy promotion.’’105 Critical inquiry into the rhetorical forms like metaphor that authorize, extend, or reassert public policy can usefully expose those forms as antidemocratic tools that sanitize public conceptions and convert well-intentioned public policy into something else entirely. These conclusions suggest that more essays explaining metaphor’s role in public policy would be welcome.

### Subject Formation NB

#### Communication inside of this space is valuable because it disrupts colonial subject formation. The ways we think and talk about a subject influence and reflect the ways we act in relation to that subject.

Karlberg ‘05 [Michael Karlberg, a professor at Western Washington University, specializes in Communism Studies “THE POWER OF DISCOURSE NAD THE DISCOURSE OF POWER: PURSUING PEACE THROUGH DISCOURSE INTERVENTION,” International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 10, Number 1, Spring/Summer 2005] Davis W

Western-liberal discourses of power and the social practices associated with them are proving inadequate to the task of creating a peaceful, just, and sustainable social order. Having recognized this, progressive scholars and social reformers have begun articulating alternative discourses of power, along with alternative models of social practice. Together, these efforts can be interpreted as a project of **discourse intervention – an effort to change our social reality by altering the discourses that help constitute it**. In order to advance this project, this paper deconstructs the dominant Western-liberal discourse of power, clarifies elements of an alternative discourse of power, and presents a case study of an alternative discourse community and the alternative models of social practice that it is constructing. **The ways we think and talk about a subject influence and reflect the ways we act in relation to that subject**. This is the basic premise of discourse theory (refer, for example, to Foucault, 1972, 1980; Hall, 1997; Phillips & Hardy, 2002). This paper is about the ways we tend to think and talk about power. In Western-liberal societies, our discourses of power are almost exclusively conflictual or adversarial. Power tends to be associated with competition at best, coercion or domination at worst. Given that the ways we think and talk about a subject influence the ways we act in relation to that subject, these adversarial discourses of power can be problematic because they obscure the mutualistic dimensions of power that have played a significant role in human history and that will need to play an even more significant role if we are to learn how to live together peacefully in an increasingly interdependent world. Peace researchers such as Kenneth Boulding (1990), along with feminist writers and theorists such as Hartsock (1974) and Miller (1982), have articulated alternative ways of thinking and talking about power for precisely this reason. These efforts can be understood as a project of discourse intervention – an effort to change our social reality by altering the discourses that help constitute that reality. To date, this project is still in a nascent stage and thus remains an important yet incomplete intervention in the Westernliberal culture of conflict. To further advance this project, an alternative discourse of power needs to be more clearly articulated. It also needs to be more fully reconciled with the conflictual models of power that are necessary for critical social analysis but insufficient as a normative framework for social practice. Toward this end, this paper briefly traces the contours of prevailing discourses of power by examining them in their most explicitly articulated form: academic discourses of power. After identifying the limitations of these existing discourses, the paper outlines an alternative vocabulary, along with a simple analytical schema, for thinking and talking about power in both its mutualistic and adversarial expressions. The paper concludes with an examination of how one alternative discourse community – the international Bahá'í community – is already constructing alternative models of social practice. Power as dominationAs a central concept within Western social theory, the academic study of power has been approached in many ways, yielding diverse and valuable insights. For example, some theorists have focused on the different forms that power takes, as well as the bases or resources that permit the exercise of power (Wartenberg, 1990; Wrong, 1997); some have explored the complex relationship between the quantitative distribution of power and the processes of social consent that legitimate various expressions of power (Hindess, 1996); some have examined the changing ways that power circulates throughout societies, constructing social institutions as well as individual subjectivities, as it imposes order and discipline in historically specific ways (Foucault, 1980); and others have approached the subject of power from other theoretical perspectives. A review of such a rich and complex body of literature is, of course, beyond the scope of this article. What this article will focus on is a dominant current of thought within late-twentieth-century scholarship that reflects popular Western-liberal discourses and assumptions regarding power. In the latter half of the twentieth century, theorists of power began to invoke what has become a widely-used distinction between two broad ways of thinking and talking about power. This distinction is made by contrasting the expression “power to” with the expression “power over” (e.g., Connolly, 1974; Coser, 1976; Dowding, 1996; Hartsock, 1974, 1983; Lukes, 1986; Macpherson, 1973; Pitkin, 1972). As Wartenberg (1990, p.27) explains, the expressions power-to and power-over are a shorthand way of making a distinction between two fundamentally different ordinary-language locutions within which the term “power” occurs. Depending upon which locution one takes as the basis of one’s theory of power, one will arrive at a very different model of the role of power in the social world. The predominant model of power in Western social theory – what I call the power as domination model – derives from the latter of these expressions. Although “power to” is the basis of models in the physical and natural sciences, “power over” highlights issues of social conflict, control, and coercion, which have been the primary focus of Western social and political scientists. This power as domination paradigm traces back, either implicitly or explicitly, through the writings of diverse social and political theorists, from Machiavelli (1961) to Weber (1986) to Bourdieu (1994). It informed Hobbes’ (1968) notion of a “war of all against all” as well as Marx and Engels’ (1967) theory of historical materialism. Indeed, as Giddens (1984, pp. 256-7) points out, this conflictual model of power underlies virtually all major traditions of Western social and political theory, from the left and the right. The extent to which Western social and political theory has developed within the boundaries of this paradigm can best be seen in the American “community power debates” of the mid-twentieth century. Within these debates, prominent power theorists from various sides of the political spectrum, including Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes, all proposed different operational definitions of the term power. Yet all of these definitions fell squarely within the boundaries of the power as domination paradigm. In brief, Dahl (1969, p. 80) conceptualized power in simple behavioral terms, explaining that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. In response to this simple behavioral definition, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argued that power over others can also be exercised in more subtle ways that involve “the mobilization of bias” within a social or political system in a manner that prevents some people or groups from advancing their own self-identified interests. As they (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p. 7) explain: Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, **B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that in their resolution might be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences**. Lukes (1974), in turn, insists that both of these conceptualizations are too simplistic. According to Lukes, power over others can also be exercised by preventing them from identifying or recognizing their own interests. In other words, power can be exercised over others by cultivating what Marx and Engels (1967) referred to as false consciousness, or by exercising what Gramsci (1971) referred to as cultural hegemony. As Lukes (1974, p. 23) explains: A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, secure their compliance by **controlling their thoughts and desires**? Though Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes each advanced different operational definitions of the term power, all of these definitions were contained within the boundaries of the power as domination paradigm. To his credit, Lukes, along with a number of other power as domination theorists since him, have acknowledged the possibility that “power to” could serve as the basis for an alternative model of social power. However, this acknowledgment has typically been made in order to dismiss “power to” models as largely irrelevant to social and political theory. As Lukes (1974, p. 30) originally contended, “power to” models have less conceptual value than “power over” models for two reasons. First, he asserted that these “revisionary persuasive redefinitions [i.e., “power to” definitions]... are out of line with the central meanings of “power” as traditionally understood and with the concerns that have always centrally preoccupied students of power” (Lukes, 1974, pp. 30-31). Second, Lukes (1974, p. 31) asserted that when one focuses on “power to” concepts “the conflictual aspect of power – the fact that it is exercised over people – disappears altogether from view, and along with it there disappears the central interest of studying power relations in the first place”. In this vein, Lukes (1974, p. 31) argues that “power to” theories end up “concealing from view the central aspects of power which they define out of existence”. Ironically, by dismissing “power to” theories, Lukes did the same thing in reverse. Similar tendencies characterize the work of many other power theorists. For instance, Wartenberg (1990, p. 5), after drawing the distinction between “power to” and “power over” quoted at the beginning of this paper, goes on to argue that a theory of power has, as a first priority, the articulation of the meaning of the concept of power-over because social theory employs this concept as a primary means of conceptualizing the nature of the fundamental inequalities in society. “Power over”, he (Wartenberg, 1990, p. 5) thus asserts, is “the primary meaning of ‘power’”. And, like Lukes, Wartenberg (1990, p. 5) argues that a focus on “power to” relations merely “shifts the theorist’s gaze away from the set of phenomena that a theory of social power must comprehend, namely the illegitimate inequalities that exist in modern societies”. Even Foucault, despite his radical re-thinking of the nature and function of power, was unable to escape the gravitational pull of the “power over” model in his own writing. Foucault (1980) understands power as a relational force that permeates the entire social body, connecting all social groups in a web of mutual influence. As a relational force, power constructs social organization and hierarchy by producing discourses and truths, by imposing discipline and order, and by shaping human desires and subjectivities. In this context, Foucault sees power as simultaneously productive and repressive: a social body cannot function without it, despite its perennially oppressive manifestations. By recognizing the productive function of power, Foucault gives a nod to the “power to” theorists. However, in his actual analyses, Foucault situates himself squarely within the power-as-domination tradition, and his over-arching project is clearly one of resistance to such expressions of power. Furthermore, he explicitly calls for others to do the same: “We should direct our researches on the nature of power”, he (Foucault, 1980, p. 102) writes, “towards domination and material operators of power”, and we should “base our analyses of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination”.

### FIAT Bad

#### Interpreting FIAT as simulation of USFG action destroys our agency in relating to the resolution – turns deliberation and advocacy and reifies hegemonic ideologies

Antonio 95 (Robert, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”, American Journal of Sociology, Volume 101, No. 1)

Treating words as mirrors of reality provides a comforting illusion of "certainty." This tendency obscures the social bases of language, reifies social conventions, and weakens capacities to imagine and create alternative conditions. Linguistic "abbreviations" cement obligatory social ties where "mutual agreement" about "feelings" is absent and the tendency to "let go" must be stemmed. Nietzsche held that language serves social selection of the herd, keeping experiences, desires, impulses, and actions of weak persons within boundaries, inscribing strong individuals as collective enemies, and redirecting ressentiment into regimentation. Accordingly, cultural rationalization makes this process of liquidating particularity more effective and universal (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 100—102, 216—17; 19686, pp. 357-58, 380). Since Nietzsche was himself a master writer, his polemics about words per se are hyperbolic.11 The real target is Socratic culture's exceptionally abstract languages, rampant conceptual reifications, and impoverished aesthetic sensibilities. Nietzsche believed that the obsession with rational representation makes the body an inert target of disciplinary control. Adoration of concepts, theory, and reason makes the abstract signifier the ultimate object of knowledge. Purely formal concepts are treated as the "highest," "real," and "true" things, while sense experience is relegated to the degraded status of "appearance." Platonic ideas, Chris- tian soul, Kantian things-in-themselves, and Newtonian atoms and time are all foundational reifications that "dehistoricize" the corporeal world and erect illusions of firm "grounds" for those who cannot face life without God and tradition or bear the weight of its connective choices and its "great dice game" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 287-90; 19686, p. 549; 19686, pp. 35-37). Destroying Socratic culture's "objective" foundations (i.e., God and Truth), the latest phase of cultural rationalization greatly amplifies feel- ings of uncertainty. The consequent desperate searching and clinging produces frenetic reification; fanatical new prejudices, religions, and politics appear alongside the most sterile intellectual formalisms. Mass culture's hastily formulated languages blur all difference and ambiguity (e.g., parties "transform their principles into great at fresco stupidities"). The proliferation of abstract signifiers, arising from diverse locations and detached from any sense of stable referents, contribute to increasingly mechanical, diffuse, and mindless regimentation. In this fashion, Nietzsche severed the links that modern theorists saw between rationalization and enhanced communication, social integration, and legitimate authority (Nietzsche 1983, p. 215; 1986, pp. 161-62; 1966, pp. 216-17; 19686, pp. 357-58, 380-81). According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations over identify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing over concern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?  A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Nietzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant.

#### IF we win that our 1AC and our reading of the 1AC today has any impact, we should win because the portable skills the neg says we trade off with have no real world value

Hester, 2013.This is a note posted to the CEDA Forums. The note is from Mike Hester, an extremely successful and influential policy debate coach at University of West Georgia. I have had a lot of respect for him through the years. -Alfred Snider, editor November 22, 2013, 01:27:03 AM. http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php/topic,5407.msg11974.html#msg11974  
To whom it may concern,   
CEDA-NDT Debate is a hot mess right now. There are so many things wrong, it can sometimes seem like they're all related. Maybe they are (reference Homer Simpson's "one big ball of lies" explanation to Marge), but a delineation may still provide some guidance as to what we can change, what we may have to accept, and where (if anywhere) we may go from here... the foundation: We no longer have one, and haven't for more than two decades. Fewer and fewer debate coaches are communication scholars, which is fine because Communication Departments don't consider us anything more than the bastard cousins who show up at the family reunion piss-drunk and demanding more potato salad. Our activity long ago (40 years?) lost any resemblance to a public speaking event attracting outside audiences. The problem is we vacated that academic space without being able to find a home anywhere else. Despite the pious assumptions of some with "policy" in mind, we are not a legitimate "research" community of scholars. The "portable skills" we currently engrain in our students via practice are: all sources are equivalent, no need for qualifications; "quoting" a source simply means underlining ANY words found ANYWHERE in the document, context and intent are irrelevant; and we are the only group outside of Faux News that believes one's argument is improved by taking every point of logic to its most absurd extreme. Simply put, 99.9% of the speech docs produced in debates would receive no better than a C (more likely F) in any upper division undergraduate research-based class. Comically, we are the public speaking research activity that is atrocious at oral persuasion and woefully in violation of any standard research practices. But this letter is not intended to bury Debate, even though it's hard to praise it in its current state. Before any peace treaty ending the Paradigm Wars can be signed and ratified, an honest appraisal of where Debate fits in the Academy is necessary.

### AT: Deliberation

**Their model of deliberation relies on a hegemonically masculine model of rationality and stasis point that attempts to push “unproductive” knowledge to the private or domestic sphere –**

Tomlinson, 10 (Barbara, “Feminism and Affect at the scene of argument”, Ch 1 – transforming the terms of reading)

Contemporary U.S. political and academic discourse abounds with a recurring set of formulaic claims that feminist scholars (and feminists in general) are angry, unreasoning, shrill, humorless, ugly, man- hating, perverse, and peculiar. This “trope of the angry feminist” is designed to delegitimize feminist argument even before the argument begins**, to undermine feminist politics** by making its costs personal, and to foreclose feminist futures by making feminism seem repulsive to young women. The trope is a convention, a plot trick, a setup, a narrative structure, a character type. 2 Its incessant repetition constitutes part of a cultural training program that makes antifeminism and misogyny a routine element in everyday speech and written argument. Instigated by expressly po liti calopposition to feminism, deploying affectively charged strategies that float free of evidence, clichés like the angry feminist put animosity— not argument— at the center of politi cal discussions, interpellating readers as always already antifeminist. The repetition and circulation of such tropes produces a cumulative overdetermined quality that makes them seem already true before the moment of argument. One never encounters the feminist’s argument for the first time because it comes already discredited. Because the trope of the angry feminist encourages unacknowledged ways of interpreting feminist affect, its inveterate irruption is consequential in journalism, entertainment, po liti cal, and quasi- intellectual arenas, as I describe in this introductory chapter. It is perhaps even more consequential in its influence on academic discourses, the subject of the remainder of the book: **affect in academic discourses on social justice is often policed through “ideologies of style” that purport to be neutral but operate to entrench current conditions of power.** In this book I argue that **we have failed to theorize adequately the role of such pervasive affective and ideologically encapsulated arguments in academic and political discourses**. In consequence, we do not recognize that our conventional reading practices mislead us about ways to comprehend and counter them. I argue that transforming the terms of reading can reframe the problem, and propose for that purpose a critical toolkit that I call “feminist socioforensic discursive analysis.” My argument here constitutes a provocation to transform the terms of reading, to reframe interpretation of affect in both feminist and antifeminist writing. Th e trope of the angry feminist is a familiar conceit, like many similar phrases **deployed to delegitimize social criticism**, one that draws on a deep well of related clichés, affective rhetorical strategies, and familiar tropes. Th ese discursive moves circulate as instantiations of power. Th e trope of the angry feminist presents itself as fresh each time it is uttered, its repetitious banality framed as mere reflection of the repetitious banality of the feminist’s argument. Th is leads to the absurd but po liti cally effi cacious situation where readers are weary of arguments they have never heard. These argumentative tactics often succeed in part because our normal reading and writing practices lead us to object or counterargue in ways that fail to come to grips with the specific nature of the rhetorical situation that the tropes instantiate. **Our conventional reading practices reinscribe ways of thinking that seem “logical” or “fair” because they are so familiar**; **they lead us to treat the tropes as surface features of discourse that serve to “skew” debate from its direct and proper form. These conventional practices, permeated by unacknowledged power relations, encourage us to respond to the tropes “normatively,” with reproaches about textual etiquette, textual responsibility, or textual appropriateness, to complain about inadequate evidence, to provide counterexamples, or to condemn the person proffering the trope, as though its use violates an agreement about the proper nature of civic discussion,** and as if there is a mechanism of accountability. None of this is the case. Responses that might chastise, correct, or even complain about the trope of the angry feminist are inadequate in part because they rest, ultimately, on an imaginary ideal: a discursive arena regulated by impartial principles in which utterances are adjudicated by unbiased observers. Framing political and even academic discussion in this commonsense way treats rhetoric as a neutral technology to be deployed or evaluated in isolation from its conditions of production, the situations of speakers, or the general societal power relations that give utterances friendly to prevailing power relations an overdetermined “reasonableness” while **rendering most oppositional arguments automatically suspect**. Our reading practices already rest on uninterrogated and deeply gendered and racialized models of textuality, argument, authorship, politeness, and emotion. Under such conditions, affect is a potent tool of dominance, infusing the reading situation to teach us what power is, who has it, how to get it, how to be rewarded, and how to avoid the punishments power can deliver. Louis Althusser (1971) argues that concrete individuals become constituted as “subjects” through ideology, but the most powerful ideological influences do not come to us in the form of ideological pronouncements. Th at would make them visible, controversial, and refutable. Instead, he argues, **the most powerful ideologies exist in “apparatuses,” in practices, and these practices are always material.** Reading, writing, and argument are social practices sedimented with ideologies of legitimacy, propriety and fairness so powerful and pervasive that we presuppose their value rather than examining their effects.

#### Their disembodied model of public deliberation is based on a utopian and masculine Cartesian subject – turns the aff

Pajnik, Mojca, 2006 ("Feminist reflections on Habermas’s communicative action the need for an inclusive political theory." European journal of social theory 9.3; p. 389-390)

Although Habermas broke with the monologic tradition, a frequent criticism among feminist authors is that his theory is too ‘Kantian’. According to this criticism, Habermas persisted in the conception of a moral individual who is disembodied and self-centred – in contrast to a relational and embodied female or male individual. Criticisms of the monologic stance of communicative action are frequent, although a closer reading of Habermas’s theory shows that Habermas’s individual is not tied to a deeper inner contemplation. Habermas’s individual is not liberated from communication with others, but is realized through interaction with others (Baynes, 1994: 319). Jane Braaten (1995) notes that Habermas, with his theory of communicative action, distances himself, on the one hand, from the Cartesian philosophy of the subject, but, on the other, reproduces it with the concept of communicative rationality. In explaining communicative rationality, Habermas becomes overly trapped in the patriarchy of traditional epistemology, which tries to defend the possibility of action in the period of the new historicism of late modernity. Braaten tries to understand Habermas’s theory through the perspective of feminist reasoning and feminist epistemology, on which she bases her alternative to communicative rationality. She calls it communicative thinking, which is based on two principles: the principle of solidarity and the principle of intersubjectivity. As an alternative to the technical image of rationality, grounded in Western, Anglo-American theoretical traditions, according to which rational action, to use Plato’s terminology, is reserved for the ‘enlightened’, Braaten advocates a rational feminist discourse which is based on the principle of solidarity and linked to the issues of discrimination against women. By defending different forms of rational action, she attempts to transcend the bounds of a technical explanation of the success and effectiveness of action, which Habermas also problematized, particularly with the critique of strategic, instrumental action (see Habermas, [1963] 1972, 1968). The difference between communicative rationality and communicative thinking is also explained by the author by drawing on the principle of intersubjectivity: in Habermas’s communicative rationality, this is too narrowly tied to the linguistic process of accepting and rejecting arguments, or is at least, as pointed out by Dallmayr (1984: 236), not clearly formulated. Communicative thinking is a concept which reflects the complexity of everyday life, and the multiple means of action and which takes into account the diversity of contexts of action. Braaten understands it as wider than communicative rationality – this she understands in a somewhat narrow sense as (merely) spoken agreement, achieved by the domination of the superior argument. Consensus, which in Habermas arises from a commonly defined objectivity, assumes ideal, abstract individuals, while communicative thinking considers life contexts and memories. Communicative thinking includes ‘imagination and flexibility’ (Braaten, 1995: 156) and relies on forms of action which try to aerate the stability of social structures. From the standpoint of the organization of society, communicative thinking does not mean a rejection or abandonment of communicative rationality, but rather an extension of rationality in the direction of conceptualization, which Darij Zadnikar recognizes in Habermas and calls ‘a multi-dimensional (“soft”) theory of rationality’ (Zadnikar, 1995: 9). Braaten, whose explanation of communicative thinking explicitly draws on a personal, even physical, feminist perspective, identifies several meanings for this concept. Communicative thinking foremost means respecting differences in everyday life with the inclusion of possibilities for the transformation of conventional politics, with the aim of meeting specific needs, for instance, those of women. It advocates the rethinking of the position of different groups of citizens to respect the specificities of life contexts and opportunities. By providing an alternative to one-dimensionality and the systematic, unified arrangement of structures, it stimulates the multi-dimensionality of expression (Braaten, 1995: 156, 157). Communicative thinking is a response to a technically defined rationality which, in the view of some critics, is still present in Habermas’s theory; it assumes the Kantian action of autonomous, rational subjects: we can speak of the success of speech acts, according to Habermas, when rational subjects act in order to achieve a rational consensus. In this, they are acting according to communicative norms, the rules of universal pragmatics, which assume a communicative competence for grammatical expression. This rigidly defined communicative rationality implies, as expressed in Benjamin Barber’s categories, too thin an understanding of communicative action and in this framework communicative thinking as an alternative is of interest.

### AT: SSD

#### Their conception of switch side normalizes opposition as a narrative of completeness that shuts out feminist considerations of IR

Sjoberg and Chessman 2012 (Laura Sjoberg, PhD in IR from USC and Professor at UF, and Christian Chessman, JD UC Berk, "The Biopower of Occupation: Insights for ‘Knowledge Exchange’in (Gender and) IR,” November 17, 2012 http://genderinglobalgovernancenet-work.net/events/critical-reflections-on-the-researcher-practitioner-relationship-2/attachment/sjoberg-and-chessman-biopower-of-occupation (rishi)).

The second contribution we argue that “Occupy” as method could make to feminist research is in understanding research more generally as being stable in its liminality rather than anchored by a static certainty about ontology, epistemology, method, or field politics. One way to think about this might be thinking about IR as art, as Christine Sylvester suggests: It takes an eye for sex and gender to see the art of it all. Even then it is difficult. Surrounded by enchanted positivism, which promises progress in knowledge – yes, this is the way! – only a long learning curve has brought us to the point of X-raying and carbon-dating the facts presented as timeless tendencies, as ‘objective’ IR. If we do not journey along the learning curve, we end up trying to draw without looking, observing, and reckoning with life. (Sylvester 2002, 273) Sylvester is arguing that seeing the world in a way that is linear, rational, and exclusively scientific neglects a number of concerns which are normatively important to feminisms, which find their substance in the political, the personal, and the critical. At the same time, anchoring research in liminality contradicts the discipline’s anchoring in a positivist social science based on approximating certainty. As researchers, liminality-as-research-goal is another uninhabitable space in IR – one which might be physically inhabited as an embodied disruption of positivist social science – one which might be a space of otherness and a space of protest all at once – both providing new intellectual turf for IR and disrupting its operationaliity. 29 Occupying Research to Occupy (Feminist) IR We are interested in a number of ways that both research practice and the political landscape of the field might change as a result of the introduction of the methodological principles for performing research and navigating the field that we glean from the ideas and practices of the ‘Occupy’ movement. In our view, one of the most useful questions such an interpretation can ask is how the space of the need to ‘do/think things differently’ becomes/became less inhabitable/uninhabitable space in the discipline of IR/the practice of governance, and how to inhabit that uninhabitable space, methodologically for IR theory and practically for the world of governance? In the paper (ready for posting soon), we think of it in terms of the “perfect operationality” (in Baudrillard’s terms) of a simulacrum of ‘what IR is’ (or, in your terms ‘how to govern’) where the system and its normalized ‘opposition’ form a tight narrative of completeness that makes ‘otherness’ to it impossible. That narrative completeness relies on bodies being where they are ‘supposed’ to be (in Foucauldian terms about biopower being an enforcer of sovereignty), and re-placement of bodies (occupation) interrupts the narrative completeness of the imperium by demonstrating the inhabitability of uninhabitable space.

# Case Neg vs. Fem IR Aff

### Poetry Bad

#### Poems lock the reader into ideology rather than allowing one to identify freely – reifies the structures they critique - turns the case

Altieri, ‘96 (Charles “Some Problems about Agency in the Theories of Radical Poetics” Contemporary Literature, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer, 1996), pp. 207-236)

All three cases offer important correctives to an academic culture that has been obsessed with interpretation as the fundamental model of readerly participation. But even this struggle against the academy requires some further considerations that I think have not been sufficiently taken up by the prevailing radical theories. Were we to grant that the fundamental problem of contemporary Western culture was a blindness inflicted by the imposition of false universals, we would still have to ask if it can suffice to base our notion of what the text offers readers on the project of resisting all hermeneutic idealization. For fact process texts, do we not condemn them to those forces that shape them as such subjects? We ignore the possibilities that the text as structure, as willed object rather than as object of free play, can actually modify beliefs and provide alternative modes of sensibility. So it seems that if poetry is to offer effective resistance to aspects of the dominant culture, we will have to grant it the power to construct hypothetical countermodels, or, at the very least, to provide modes of second-order reading by which an audience is invited to take some distance from its own direct first-order habits. Poems must foster readerly identities that simultaneously align imaginations with specific processes confronting dominant ideological structures and reflect on what is at stake in the choices made as one reads.

### Turn – Academy

#### The AFF operates within the academy, destroying the emancipatory potential on two fronts: the authors of their lit are removed from the actual problems and information produced in the academy will only serve to hold up the structural issues they critique—anything else won’t be published

**Lynch 1999** (Kathleen, University of Dublin, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 30, No. 1, January, 1999, pp. 41-69)

While several feminist theorists have engaged with the contradictions of their class position in relation to emancipatory research, critical theorists often tend to ignore the logic of the sets of cultural relations within which academic knowledge is produced. Critical theorists, no more than other intellectuals “tend to leave out of play their own game and their own stakes”...Yet, “the production of representations of the social world, which is a fundamental dimension of political struggles, is the virtual monopoly of intellectuals...” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 37). Even academics who are themselves critical of the failure of critical theory to problematise its own fundamental assumptions, do not address themselves to the problem of the academically embedded context in which theory is constructed (Sayer’s, 1995 critique of critical theory is a case in point). Academics create virtual realities, textual realities, ethnographic and statistical realities. These overhang and frame the lived existence of those who cannot name their own world; it is frequently in the context of these detached and remoter realities that public policy is often enacted. The frame becomes the picture in the public eye. Yet theoretical knowledge has serious limitations imposed upon it by the conditions of its own performance. The relations of cultural production within which critical theory, feminist theory, and egalitarian theory are produced are generally no different to those that operate for the study of nuclear physics, corporate law or business and finance. Although some academics may view themselves as radical, reforming, feminist or emancipatory, they occupy a particular location within the class system (Bourdieu, 1993, pp. 36-48). They are part of the cultural elite of society. It is the designation of cultural elitism which provides them with the structural conditions to write; it gives them credibility over other voices and reinforces the perception of superiority which maintains the salary differentials between themselves and other workers. Being granted the freedom from necessity to write and discuss is a privilege which academics (be they liberal, radical or conservative) in well-funded universities are rarely asked to reflect upon, however. Yet, academics are also subordinate to powerful corporate interest groups in the business and industrial sector. In a sense, therefore, they occupy a contradictory class location (Davies, 1995), being at once an elite in the cultural sphere and relatively subordinate in the industrial or financial sphere. Thus, while the concept of the “free-floating, disinterested intellectual” may be part of the ideology of academia it is not grounded in any sociological reality; even radical intellectuals are culturally, and relatively financially, privileged. Operating within a contradictory state, of being personally radical and publicly privileged, makes it difficult for many politically left-wing academics to be progressive in cultural or university politics. It is much simpler to be progressive in general politics that do not touch the core values of one’s own work. Bourdieu (1993, p. 45) suggests that there is no easy resolution to this dilemma for radical intellectuals. He proposes a radical, ongoing reflexivity wherein one prepares “the conditions for a critical knowledge of the limits of knowledge which is the precondition for true knowledge” as the principal protection available. In this way, researchers know where they themselves stand in the classification system. Even if academics do engage in ongoing reflexivity, this does not alter the structural conditions under which they work. The dilemma posed by unequal power between researcher and research subject is not readily resolved, even when the researcher works with emancipatory intent (Lentin 1993, p. 128; Martin, 1996). It is generally the researchers who produce the final text, the written record of the research event. This gives them a power of definition which cannot be abrogated at will. Moreover, the very efforts of those interested in transforming the relations of research production (from those of dominance to those of partnership or emancipation) are deeply implicated in the exercise of power. One cannot escape the reality of power relations even within the language of emancipation. In addition, intellectuals work in institutions which lay down working conditions based on the dominant meritocratic principles of our time — ostensibly at least, promotion is based on merit. The way in which merit is measured is in terms of conformity to the dominant norms of intellectual and academic discourse. This includes not only writing with the dominant paradigm (Kuhn, 1961) but writing about what is currently intellectually fashionable. Without at least a nodding recognition of the importance of the dominant discourses, then one’s work is not likely to be published.6 And it is through their publications that intellectuals in universities are generally assessed. While “there is something desperate in the docility with which “free intellectuals” rush to hand in their essays on the required subject of the moment” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 43) the fact remains that academics jobs and incomes are often dependent on such conformity. **Not only does the academy generally only recognise those who conform to the intellectual norms of the day, it penalises those who attempt to redefine the purpose of the academy**. Lectures, consultations and involvements with nonacademic bodies do not count in terms of the enumerations of one’s work or achievements.7 This acts as a very effective control on academic work limiting and containing interests within the safe confines of the university. It also works effectively to preclude intellectuals from involving themselves, and the university, in radicalising initiatives. While “established or tenured” academics can afford to indulge in such developments, sanctioning via limited promotional opportunities continues to exercise control even over these. Yet, public lectures and involvements with voluntary, statutory, community and other organisations is essential if research findings are to be circulated outside the narrow confines of the academy. Given that the production of scientific knowledge generally is often legitimated on the grounds that it will contribute to progress, and to the ultimate general good of humanity, it is difficult to see how this can happen without the dissemination of the findings outside the academy in accessible contexts and language. What is interesting about the boundary maintenance which goes on in universities is that it is not confined to any one field (Bernstein, 1971). It occurs within and between disciplines, and between the university itself and the “outside community”. **Academic knowledge is defined as “superior” knowledge. The fact that the academic perspective is only one viewpoint, and that it may need to be complemented by other forms of understanding by non-academic research subjects is largely ignored** (Lather, 1986). The parameters within which academic dialogue takes place, therefore, are narrowly defined thereby inhibiting criticism of academic discourse itself, and prohibiting academics from understanding the world from the perspectives of the “other” outside the academy

### Turn – Disciplinary Power

#### The politicization of identity requires categorization – generates disciplinary regimes which neutralize differences within identity categories and reinscribes relations of domination

Brown, 1995. (Wendy, Professor of Political Science and Rhetoric at UC-Berkeley, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*, published by Princeton UP, p. 65-66; spp)

**Contemporary politicized identity is also potentially reiterative of regulatory**,¶ disciplinary society in its configuration of a disciplinary subject.¶ It is **both produced by and potentially accelerates the production of that¶ aspect of disciplinary society which "ceaselessly characterizes, classifies,¶ and specializes,"** which works through "surveillance, continuous registration,¶ perpetual assessment, and classification," through a social machinery¶ "**that is both immense and minute**. "19 An example from the¶ world of local politics makes clear politicized identity's imbrication in¶ disciplinary power, as well as the way in which, as Foucault reminds us,¶ disciplinary power "infiltrates" rather than replaces liberal juridical¶ modalities. 20¶ Recently, the city council of my town reviewed an ordinance, devised¶ and promulgated by a broad coalition of identity-based political groups,¶ which aimed to ban discrimination in employment, housing, and public¶ accommodations on the basis of "**sexual orientation, transsexuality, age,¶ height, weight, personal appearance, physical characteristics, race, color,¶ creed, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, marital status, sex, or¶ gender. "**21 Here is a perfect instance of the universal juridical ideal of¶ liberalism and the normalizing principle of disciplinary regimes conjoined¶ and taken up within the discourse of politicized identity. This¶ ordinance-variously called the "purple hair ordinance" or the "ugly ordinance" by state and national news media-aims to count every difference¶ as no difference, as part of the seamless whole, but also to count¶ every potentially subversive rejection of culturally enforced norms as¶ themselves normal, as normalizable, and as normativizable through law.¶ Indeed, through the definitional, procedural, and remedies sections of¶ this ordinance (e.g., "**sexual orientation shall mean known or assumed¶ homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality**") **persons** are **reduced** to¶ observable socia**l attributes and practices defined empirically, positivistically,**¶ as if their existence were intrinsic and factual, rather than¶ effects of discursive and institutional power; and these positivist definitions¶ of persons as their attributes and practices are written into law,¶ ensuring that persons describable according to them will now become¶ **regulated through them**. Bentham couldn't have done it better. Indeed,¶ here is a perfect instance of how the language of recognition becomes the¶ language of unfreedom, how articulation in language, in the context of¶ liberal and disciplinary discourse, becomes a vehicle of subordination¶ **through individualization, normalization, and regulation, even as it¶ strives to produce visibility and acceptance.** Here, also, is a perfect instance¶ of the way in which "**differences" that are the effects of social¶ power are neutralized through their articulation as attributes and their¶ circulation through liberal administrative discourse:** what do we make of¶ a document that renders as juridical equivalents the denial of employment¶ to an African American, an obese woman, and a white middleclass¶ youth festooned with tattoos, a pierced tongue, and fuchsia hair?

#### Disciplinary power is coercive and violent – causes people to internalize their self-worth soley in terms of their productive capacities

Foucault, 75 (1975. Michel, *Discipline and Punish* – Second Vintage Books Edition, 1995, p. 152-153; spp)

4. The body-object articulation. Discipline defines each of the relations that the body must have with the object that it manipulates. Between them, it outlines a meticulous meshing. ‘Bring the weapon forward. In three stages. Raise the rifle with the right hand, bringing it close to the body so as to hold it perpendicular with the right knee, the end of the barrel at the eye level, grasping it by striking it with the right hand, the arm held close to the body at waist height. At the second stage, bring the rifle in front of you with the left hand, the barrel in the middle between the two eyes, vertical, the right hand grasping it at the small of the butt, the arm outstretched, the trigger-guard resting on the first finger, the left hand at the height of the notch, the thumb lying along the barrel against the moulding. At the third stage, let go of the rifle with the left hand, which falls along the thigh, raising the rifle with the right hand, the lock outwards and opposite the chest, the right arm half flexed, the elbow close to the body, the thumb lying against the lock, resting against the first screw, the hammer resting on the first finger, the barrel perpendicular’ (‘Ordonnance du janvier 1766…, titre XI, article 2’). ¶ This is an example of what might be called the instrumental coding of the body. It consists in the breakdown of the total gesture into two parallel series: that of the parts of the body, to be used (right hand, left hand, different fingers of the hand, knee, eye, elbow, etc.) and that of the parts of the object manipulated (barrel, notch, hammer, screw, etc.); then the two sets of parts are correlated together according to a number of simple gestures (rest, bend); lastly, it fixes the canonical succession in which each of these correlations occupies a particular place. This obligatory syntax is what the military theoreticians of the eighteenth century called 'manoeuvre'. The traditional recipe gives place to explicit and obligatory prescriptions. Over the whole surface of contact between the body and the object it handles, power is introduced, fastening them to one another. It constitutes a body-weapon, body-tool, body-machine complex. One is as far as possible from those forms of subjection that demanded of the body only signs or products, forms of expression or the result of labour. The regulation imposed by power is at the same time the law of construction of the operation. Thus disciplinary power appears to have the function not so much of deduction as of synthesis, not so much of exploitation of the product as of coercive link with the apparatus of production.

### Turn – Reinstates Domination

#### Their performance of an ideal world mirrors a reversal of suffering without addressing subject constitution – this reinstates the structure of oppression which they attempt to fight

Brown, 1995. (Wendy, Professor of Political Science and Rhetoric at UC-Berkeley, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*, published by Princeton UP, p. 7; spp)

But this opens rather than settles the problem of how to formulate a discourse¶ of freedom appropriate to contesting contemporary antidemocratic¶ configurations of power. One of the ironies of what Nietzsche boldly¶ termed the **"instinct for freedom" lies in its inceptive self-cancellation**, its¶ crossing of itself in its very first impulse. Initial figurations of freedom¶ are inevitably reactionary in the sense of emerging reaction to perceived¶ injuries or constraints of a regime from within its own terms.¶ Ideals of freedom ordinarily emerge to vanquish their imagined immediate enemies, but in this move they frequently recycle and reinstate¶ rather than transform the terms of domination that generated them. Consider¶ exploited workers who dream of a world in which work has been¶ abolished, blacks who imagine a world without whites, **feminists who**¶ **conjure a world either without men or without sex, or** teenagers who, fantasize¶ a world without parents. Such **images of freedom** perform **mirror reversals of suffering without transforming the organization of the activity**¶ through which the suffering is produced and without addressing the subject¶ constitution that domination effects, that is, the constitution of the social categories, “workers,” “blacks,” “women,” or “teenagers.”¶ It would thus appear that it is freedom’s relationship to identity-its¶ promise to address a social injury or marking that is itself constitutive of¶ identity – that yields the paradox in which the first imaginings of freedom¶ are always constrained by and potentially even require the very¶ structure of oppression that freedom emerges to oppose.

#### Their attempt to order politics around women’s freedom requires the specter of patriarchal unfreedom – this locks in the power dynamic they criticize

Brown, 1995. (Wendy, Professor of Political Science and Rhetoric at UC-Berkeley, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*, published by Princeton UP, p. 8-9; spp)

Invoking Marx recalls a second dimension of this paradox in which¶ **freedom responds to a particular practice of domination whose terms are¶ then often reinstalled in its practice.** When institutionalized, freedom¶ premised upon an already vanquished enemy keeps alive, in the manner¶ of a melancholic logic, a threat that works as domination in the form of¶ an absorbing ghostly battle with the past. 7 Institutionalized, freedom arrayed¶ against a particular image of unfreedom sustains that image, which¶ **dominates political life with its specter long after it has been vanquished**¶ and preempts appreciation of new dangers to freedom posed by institutions¶ designed to hold the past in check. Yet the very institutions that are¶ erected to vanquish the historical threat also recuperate it as a form of¶ **political anxiety**; so, for example, functions the "**state of nature**" or the¶ "**arbitrary sovereign**" in the liberal political imagination.¶ It may be the extent to which freedom institutionalized transmogrifies¶ into its opposite that led Foucault to insist upon understanding liberty as¶ a practice rather than a state, as that which can "never [be] assured¶ by ... institutions and laws" but "must be exercised. "B Sheldon Wolin¶ presses a similar point in his provocation that "a constitution, in setting¶ limits to politics, set limits as well to democracy .... Democracy thus¶ seems destined to be a moment rather than a form. "9 In Jean-Luc¶ Nancy's account, "freedom ... is the very thing that prevents itself¶ from being founded. '' And a similar concern can be discerned in¶ Hannah Arendt's insistence on the perniciousness of equating freedom¶ with sovereignty, along with her counterproposition that freedom as¶ "**virtuosity**" is defined by the contingency of action, as the place where¶ "**the I-will and the I-can coincide" as power.**11¶ Recognition of the tension, if not the antinomy, between freedom and¶ institutionalization compounds the difficulties of formulating a politics of¶ freedom in the late twentieth century, the age of institutions. Not only¶ do we require a historically and institutionally specific reading of contemporary¶ modes of domination, but freedom’s "actualization" would¶ appear to be a frustratingly indeterminate matter of ethos, of bearing¶ toward institutions, of the style of political practices, rather than a matter¶ of policies, laws, procedures, or organization of political orders. This is¶ not to say that freedom becomes aesthetic, but rather that it depends¶ upon a formulation of the political that is richer, more complicated, and¶ also perhaps more fragile than that circumscribed by institutions, procedures, and political representation.

### Turns Solvency

#### Politicized identity relies on a negation of an ostensible universalism –dooms their project into recreating the impacts of the aff

Brown, 1995. (Wendy, Professor of Political Science and Rhetoric at UC-Berkeley, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*, published by Princeton UP, p. 64-65; spp)

Contemporary **politicized identity** in the United States contests the terms¶ of liberal discourse insofar as it challenges liberalism's universal "we" as a¶ strategic fiction of historically hegemonic groups and asserts liberalism's¶ "I" as social-both relational and constructed by power-rather than¶ contingent, private, or autarkic. Yet it reiterates the terms of liberal discourse¶ insofar as it posits a sovereign and unified "I" that is disenfranchised by an exclusive "we." Indeed, I have suggested that **politicized identity emerges and obtains its unifying coherence through the politicization of**¶ **exclusion** from an ostensible universal, as a protest against exclusion: a protest premised on the fiction of an inclusive/ universal¶ community, a protest that thus **reinstalls** the humanist ideal-and a specific **white**,¶ middle-class, **masculinist** expression of this ideal-insofar as it premises itself upon exclusion from it. Put the other way around, politicized identities¶ generated out of liberal, disciplinary societies, insofar as they are premised on exclusion from a universal ideal, require that ideal, as their exclusion from it, for their own continuing existence as identities.

# Cap K vs. Fem IR Aff

### Cap Links – Gender

#### Capitalism is the sole antagonism standing in the way of liberation. A singular focus on gender eschews a wider class based struggle cannot produce effective change. Only a unified and decisive blow to capitalism can rupture the patriarchy.

**Previato 02**- *In Defence of Marxism* – launched in 1998 – has become one of the world's foremost sources of Marxist theory, analysis on current events and the history of the revolutionary workers’ movement. https://www.marxist.com/marxism-feminism-womens-day101002.htm

In 1808, in his *Theory of four movements*, Fourier explained that "social progress is measured by the progress of the woman towards freedom". Later, Marx and Engels analysed the development of human society in detail, not only from the economic viewpoint but also culturally and in the relationship between the sexes. **Marxism analysed the origin of women's oppression and laid the theoretical basis for overcoming it**. In particular Engels, in *The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884), starting from the scientific and anthropological knowledge of that time, showed the dynamic nature of social structures and how these structures are linked to the level of development of the productive forces. "The increase of production in all branches - cattle-raising, agriculture, domestic handicrafts - gave human labour-power the capacity to produce a larger product than was necessary for its maintenance. (…) As to how and when the herds passed out of the common possession of the tribe or the gens into the ownership of individual heads of families, we know nothing at present. But in the main it must have occurred during this stage. With the herds and the other new riches, a revolution came over the family. To procure the necessities of life had always been the business of the man; he produced and owned the means of doing so. The herds were the new means of producing these necessities; the taming of the animals in the first instance and their later tending were the man's work. To him, therefore, belonged the cattle, and to him the commodities and the slaves received in exchange for cattle. All the surplus which the acquisition of the necessities of life now yielded fell to the man; the woman shared in its enjoyment, but had no part in its ownership. The "savage" warrior and hunter had been content to take second place in the house, after the woman; the "gentler" shepherd, in the arrogance of his wealth, pushed himself forward into the first place and the woman down into the second. And she could not complain. (…) "The man now being actually supreme in the house, the last barrier to his absolute supremacy had fallen. This autocracy was confirmed and perpetuated by the overthrow of mother-right, the introduction of father-right, and the gradual transition of the pairing marriage into monogamy. But this tore a breach in the old gentile order; the single family became a power, and its rise was a menace to the gens.(1) (Fredrick Engels, *Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, Chapter IX: Barbarism and Civilization.) Since these ancient origins, women have been looked on as inferior beings. A contemporary of Marx in Italy, the abbot Rosmini, inspired the upbringing of many “young ladies” from good families and appealed to nature to emphasise their age-old subjection to men: "It is for the husband, according to the convenience of nature, to be lord and master; it is for the woman, and so it should be, to be almost an appendage, a complement to the husband, entirely consecrated to him and dominated by his name”(2). These theories may cause some amusement and sound out of date, but they formed the basis for family law in Italy right up until 1975, when it was finally reformed after very hard struggles. While struggles and debates have arisen around this question in many moments in history, the rise of capitalism marked a decisive transition which radically changed the relations between individuals. Liberation outside the walls of the home As Engels explains, the oppression of the woman within the household was the result of change outside it. To the degree in which the labour of the man, linked to herding and agriculture, began to produce the wealth of those societies by producing a surplus over and above family needs, which was "sold", domestic labour ceased to be the fundamental wealth. It was of a private nature, could not be exchanged for other goods on the market and thus lost its value. The labour of the man, whose products were exchanged for gain, became productive, while that of the woman, whose product was not for sale, became unproductive. This change outside the family marked an overturning of the balance of forces within it. To quote Engels again: "We can already see from this that to emancipate woman and make her the equal of the man is and remains an impossibility so long as the woman is shut out from social productive labor and restricted to private domestic labor. The emancipation of woman will only be possible when woman can take part in production on a large, social scale, and domestic work no longer claims anything but an insignificant amount of her time. And only now has that become possible through modern large-scale industry, which does not merely permit of the employment of female labor over a wide range, but positively demands it, while it also tends towards ending private domestic labor by changing it more and more into a public industry."(3) (Fredrick Engels, *Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, Chapter IX: Barbarism and Civilization.) The development of the capitalist mode of production actually had important repercussions on all women, from those of the upper classes to proletarian women. It was precisely the processes explained by Engels which pushed bourgeois women, and even some from the nobility, to demand more rights, and, as we shall attempt to clarify here by describing some of the struggles at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, to shake up consciousness and the social system. The class struggle and the struggle against patriarchal society However, the capitalist mode of production marked an irreconcilable break between the interests of the exploited and the exploiters. The capitalist system pushes the individual to find a role in social production. Thus not only did bourgeois women come out of their "gilded prisons" to demand a seat in Parliament or a place in male professions, but also millions of peasant women and housewives were thrust by want into large-scale production: the factory, the mill, the mine, the office and the call center have become the place of a further form of oppression: class oppression. This second burden, however, brings them out of the solitude of the four walls, gives them the chance to find other female and male comrades in the fight against their exploited position, become protagonists in their own lives, break their subjection to men and strike a blow against patriarchal society. The whole experience of women workers' struggles teaches just this: the struggle in the workplace is always accompanied by a crisis in the family, with men looking suspiciously on the new female protagonism while women, gaining confidence in their abilities, no longer put up with abuse and ridicule by fathers, husbands and brothers. Entry into the world of labour, the earning of a wage and, ultimately, the class conflict, do not automatically lead to the liberation of the woman, but communists who set themselves this aim must understand the connection between these two aspects; it is the class conflict that most clearly reveals to women in general the reactionary nature of the family as a place where individuals, and especially women and children, suffer oppression. Communists must take advantage of this objective condition to put forward a different idea of how human beings can live together, based on the socialisation of economic resources, of household tasks, of the care and upbringing of children. But above all they must make it clear that the cause of the tensions and violence that are part of daily family life lies in the private nature of the responsibilities that capitalism necessarily unloads onto the shoulders of the family and of women in particular. So breaking women’s oppression, breaking down this private character, means making the struggle for women's liberation part of the struggle against capitalism. Taking up the women's question is not just an extra, but a decisive issue which brings the struggle against capitalism onto more advanced ground. Communists do not fight this system only because it forces three quarters of the world into the most inhuman poverty, but also because it is a brake on the development of culture, science and human resources, and from a simple brake it is transforming itself more and more into a system leading to barbarism in human relationships even in the advanced capitalist countries. Thus the battle is also an ideological one. The nature of feminism Up to now we have avoided using the term feminism in relation to the struggle of the women's movement and we believe that a few clarifications are needed concerning this term. It was Fourier who first spoke of feminism, giving the term a positive value as it meant the struggle of women against their oppression. However, historically the term has been taken over basically by movements with a bourgeois or petty bourgeois leadership, often coming into conflict with the labour movement and its organisations. The feminist movement, particularly after the Second World War, produced ideas and analyses which were unquestionably valid, and in some cases adopted revolutionary Marxist ideas. However, the fact remains that overall it remained a prisoner of a reductionist view of the women's question, which saw it as a central battle with all women being lumped together regardless of their social background and separately from all other struggles (wages, social conditions, etc.). While it is true that the denial of rights affects women of different social classes, there is an enormous gap between the conditions of women, according to the class they belong to, and this distance is inevitably reproduced in the aims they set themselves. First of all there is the question of property. Bourgeois women have to look after their own and their family’s and acquaintances’ property. Proletarian women, with their class demands, together with their demands as women, are a constant threat to bourgeois property, which is challenged not only by the programme of the labour movement (which may be more or less advanced) but particularly by the methods of struggle (strikes, occupations, etc.) and the mass character of these struggles. Secondly there is the problem of the goals of the struggle. Historically the feminist movement has had many different expressions which we will analyse later in this text. Here we will try to summarise these objectives: the central theme for bourgeois women in the feminist movement is the cultural battle. At the beginning of the 20th century this was expressed in the extension of democratic rights, such as the right to vote, the right to study and access to the "male" professions (lawyers, doctors etc.), but it later found its demands in female protagonism and against a Catholic culture which saw the woman as the "angel of the hearth" (divorce, abortion rights). This cultural battle was often accompanied by a strong verbal radicalism and also by "exemplary" actions aimed at showing the revolutionary and universal character of those demands. Basically, however, although democratic rights for women are universal, in other words they involve everyone, posing the cultural struggle separately from the economic system gives this battle a partial character. It may have striking effects but does not undermine the system. Hence the eternal debate as to whether we should demand women's emancipation or liberation. The most moderate sections of the movement naturally limited themselves to demanding a few adjustments to women's conditions, campaigning for a more or less slow emancipation process. Other sections, which were more radical but often more confused, demanded a genuine liberation, but did not understand that to achieve this they had to go beyond the narrow limits of feminism and take part in a broad struggle against capitalism, putting forward a more radical, revolutionary programme within the workers' movement. Working women and patriarchal ideology On the other hand, for women workers, their oppression within the home is interwoven with social conditions. For women workers this is represented by the suffocation of housework and child-minding. Unlike bourgeois women they cannot unload these chores onto wage labour (baby-sitters, maids, etc). Over the last few decades in the advanced countries there has been a certain involvement of men in looking after the children and in housework, but the ultimate responsibility continues to rest on the shoulders of the woman. In the poorer layers and the working class this responsibility is even greater, as capitalist society has no interest in socializing it. This situation changes the role of the woman, and particularly the woman worker, in society; time is dedicated to the house, the children, running the house in general at the expense of study, union activity, politics, improvement of working conditions etc. However, as opposed to bourgeois women, working class women, although they are also oppressed by their men, are forced to take a more tortuous and laborious path to free themselves. The men of their social class do not have a nice, well-paid profession for them to envy or compete for. Although men workers on average are better paid than women workers, it is still wage labour. What remains is a couple and family life which is unsustainable from a human and economic viewpoint, and inevitably goes into crisis. And here too we see the greatest difficulties affecting women workers; for them the prospect of divorce means having to face life as a single person, probably with children (who in 98% of cases go to the mother), on a starvation wage and with an extra rent to pay. Capitalism imposes on the women the double burden of work outside and inside the home. When this burden is unbearable no solution is offered except more loneliness and a disrupted social life. About half of households in Italy are no longer of the traditional type (father, mother, child/children); in most cases they are women desperately looking for a way to emancipation from family oppression, but while they may escape from their obligations towards a husband, they cannot escape the women’s role that capitalism in any case thrusts upon them. The care of the children remains, discrimination in the workplace remains, economic need remains and even increases, as does the need for human solidarity, but here the division of roles by sex is once more reproduced. Women workers, unlike middle class women, can react to this loneliness of oppression suffered in private by taking up a role in struggles in their workplace. The class struggle is a collective struggle and demonstrates the power of women workers, increasing their confidence in their abilities and helping to make broad layers of the female working class aware of their oppressed condition as women in society, showing how collective action can combat the oppression of women too. In order for this to be expressed in a conscious struggle for their own liberation, a revolutionary analysis and programme are needed. But the reformist organizations of the labour movement have gone from a sometimes openly hostile attitude (consider the Italian socialists who opposed the vote for women) to posing the problem in an exclusively economic manner (equal pay, conditions, hours etc.), without taking up the revolutionary implications of the struggle against women’s oppression and even claiming that the problem was something concerning exclusively middle class women. Subsequently, in the absence of an independent class analysis, the reformist leaders capitulated completely to feminist conceptions, adopting the ideas and demands of the most moderate sections. To this it should be added that the feminist movement has always looked on women workers as “second-class sisters”, partly because they were less open to its arguments and partly because they were looked on as practically irretrievable victims of male domination of the workers’ organizations. This attitude of self-sufficiency is shown by the almost complete absence of writings about the struggles of working class women, compared with a far greater number of publications about the strictly feminist movement, not to mention the deafening silence surrounding women’s conquests in the Soviet Union thanks to the October Revolution. Feminism and the workers’ movement Having said this, we must seek a correct relationship between feminism and the labour movement and between the conflict between the sexes and the class struggle. While the women’s question must be taken up by communists, as explained above, we must oppose a partial approach which places the cultural battle at the centre of our campaigns, independently of class origin. This approach causes a lowering of the consciousness with which women approach their condition, where women can see only a description of their oppression without being offered the means to overcome it. As we have explained, women’s oppression did not originate with capitalism, but the existence of capitalism represents the decisive obstacle to overcoming it. This system is obliged to base its rule on the oppression of the working class and so has to encourage all possible divisions within it. The patriarchal ideology is fundamental to guarantee a wide layer of female labour where it can impose inferior wages and conditions, and who can enter and leave the labour market as needed, acting as a constant downward pressure on the wages and conditions of the whole working class. In exactly the same way, racism is used to divide the working class on race lines. Thus, although capitalism thrusts women into social production, along with immigrants from the more backward areas of the world, it must at the same time promote the idea that a woman’s duty is to stay at home to look after her children and family. Thus capitalism, along with its church ideologues, has become the fundamental instigator of women’s oppression. For anyone dealing with the women’s question, it is an inescapable task to expose this link, showing how the patriarchal culture is used and promoted by capitalism to maintain its rule. Any struggle that does not take this into account is not only doomed to defeat, but will be incapable of orienting women workers and those middle class women who do not just want to adjust their conditions but aspire to genuine liberation. Finally we must deal with the reasons why the class struggle has a central place in comparison with the struggle between the sexes. Firstly, from what we have said so far, it is clear that liberating the woman, or at least creating a basis for her liberation, means first of all liberating the economic resources to enable the socialization of housework and child-minding, chores which tie women to their responsibilities and to their role as women in society. Freeing these resources means coming into conflict with private ownership of the means of production, with the ruling class. It means posing the need for a revolutionary process towards socialism, with the taking of power by the working class; the nationalisation of the multinationals and of the commanding heights of the economy with the planning of these resources under the control of the masses who are exploited today. Only in such a context, in a socialist society, could they be used for the benefit of the masses themselves. The central position of the working class in this process is determined by its role in social production, by the fact that the workers, as a class of wage labourers, enable capitalism to function and exist, even though they may not be aware of this power in normal times. Their involvement is therefore decisive so that their strength can become a conscious force, able to challenge the established order. This central position has recently been disputed in the left, by those who argue that there are other equally important conflicts, such as precisely the conflict between the sexes, or over the environment. Here we are not questioning the importance of these issues. What we are stressing is what is the central contradiction round which all the other contradictions turn. The women’s question, like the environment, cannot be solved independently from the abolition of capitalism, a system which is now incapable of guaranteeing a harmonious development for women and for humankind in general. In addition it is not possible to conduct a cultural battle without posing the central question of breaking the motor force of this culture and overthrowing the ruling class which expresses its interests through that culture. Thus it falls on the shoulders of the working class, which has the potential, as explained above, and the responsibility to carry out these tasks which the capitalist system cannot guarantee, starting now also an ideological campaign, first of all among women workers themselves and then, once power has been conquered, implementing our proposals for liberation. The brief notes which follow are of a mainly historical nature and aim to illustrate the ideas set out above. As we have already stated, we are interested in pointing out both the validity and the limitations of the middle class movements internationally, among the most important of which was the British suffragettes movement, but for reasons of space we will be concentrating on the Italian experience.

### Cap Links - PoMo Fem

#### The affs engagement in post-structural feminism culminates in the reification of enlightenment thinking and capitalist hierarchies.

Willey 14- Marilynn is a passionate supporter of Wellesley and its mission to prepare students to make meaningful contributions to the world through disciplined thinking and engagement with diverse perspectives. She is thrilled to support the Freedom Project's efforts to be a beacon of tolerance and pluralism both on campus and beyond file:///Users/ethancooper/Downloads/WCTC\_2014\_WilleyMarilynn\_ACritiqueofPostmoder.pdf

In attempting to expound upon the thinking behind poststructuralist feminism, Alcoff explains, “The mechanism of power referred to here is the construction of the subject by a discourse that weaves knowledge and power into a coercive structure…on this view, essentialist formulations of womanhood, even when made by feminists, ‘tie’ the individual to her identity as a woman and thus cannot represent a solution to sexism.” 94 The problem with this view, when it is applied to social and political movements, is that it places the individual’s ability and desire to subjectively create and design their own identity and purpose as the highest moral good - there is not higher order or meaning beyond what the individual creates as part of their autonomous and non-essential identity. As Alcoff explains, “The political struggle can have only a ‘negative function:’ rejecting ‘everything finite, definite, structured, loaded with meaning, in the existing state of society.’”95 Such a view might be helpful when addressing individual psychological or social difficulties, but it is a problematic way to lead a social movement and a destructive way to lead people in understanding their role in a social, humane world. Alcoff’s criticism is rooted in the philosophically challenging aspect of such a view: “Applied to the concept of woman the poststructuralist’s view !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 93 Ibid, 8. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid, 11. 48 results in what I shall call nominalism: the idea that the category of ‘woman’ is a fiction and that feminist efforts must be directed toward dismantling this fiction.”96 Alcoff explains that the appeal of post-structuralism to feminist thinkers is twofold: “First, it seems to hold out the promise of an increased freedom for women, the ‘free play’ of a plurality of differences unhampered by any predetermined gender identity as formulated by either patriarchy or cultural feminism. Second, it moves decisively beyond cultural feminism and liberal feminism in further theorizing what they leave untouched: the construction of subjectivity.”97 Interestingly, Alcoff notes the extent to which poststructuralist feminism is a direct descendent of classical liberal views on the individual: “Despite rumblings from the Continent, Anglo-American thought is still wedded to the ideal of a universalizable, apolitical methodology and set of transhistorical basic truths unfettered by associations with particular genders, races, classes, or cultures.” 98 Alcoff sees the generic human idea, promoted in Enlightenment thinking, as closely related to post-structuralism’s designation of “individual particularities such as subjective experience as a social construct,” and claims that “post-structuralism’s negation of the authority of the subject coincides nicely with the classical liberal’s view that human particularities are irrelevant. (For the liberal, race, class, and gender are ultimately irrelevant to questions of justice and truth because ‘underneath we are all the same.’)” Perhaps Alcoff’s most relevant and pressing question is the one that points to the primary problem facing any proponent of poststructuralist feminism: “A feminist !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid, 13. 49 adoption of nominalism will be confronted with the same problem theories of ideology have, that is, Why is a right-wing woman’s consciousness constructed via social discourse but a feminist’s consciousness is not?”99 It has been recognized by many feminists in academia that disagreements among feminists are cause for concern, especially those who wish to see feminist ideas of any form succeed. The editors of Conflicts in Feminism note in their introduction that, While feminists have in principle tended to agree that difference is a more productive theoretical and political category than either universalizing consensus or divisive oppositions, in practice, actual differences within feminist discourse have tended to erupt into separate camps. At this moment in time, some of these conflicts have proven so divisive that they seem to foreclose rather than stimulate debate, even at times appearing to threaten the very viability of contemporary feminism as a political and theoretical venture.100 The problems that result from such a stifling intellectual climate are apparent not only to those dealing with feminism in theory, but also among those putting it into practice in the classroom or in the public sphere. The editors of Conflicts in Feminism also echo Alcoff’s observation that “A common divide keeps forming in both feminist thought and action between the need to build the identity ‘woman’ and give it solid political meaning and the need to tear down the very category ‘woman’ and dismantle its all-too-solid history.”101 They recognize that neither approach is without fault: social construction does not seem plausible to the average person, and “to assert that the body has no enduring, natural language often !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 99 Ibid, 12. 100 Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller, “Introduction,” Conflicts in Feminism, (New York: Routledge, 1990), 4. 101 Ann Snitow, “A Gender Diary,” in Conflicts in Feminism, 9. 50 seems like a rejection of common sense.”102 Not only is it a tough sell to a mainstream audience, but also the poststructuralist approach is logically problematic, in that “By definition social construction theory cannot offer a securely bounded area for the study of gender; instead it initiates an inspiring collapse of gender verities.”103 Alcoff offers a similar sentiment, asking, “If gender is simply a social construct, the need and even the possibility of a feminist politics becomes immediately problematic. What can we demand in the name of women if ‘women’ do not exist and demands in their name simply reinforce the myth that they do?”104 Such an approach eventually leads to an almost nihilistic nothingness - a void in which there is no need for women’s liberation because women do not exist. The editors also touch on an important dichotomy in feminist thought, somewhat analogous to Alcoff’s cultural feminism and poststructuralist feminism: Equality and difference are broad ideas and have included a rrange of definitions and political expressions. Equality, for example, can mean anything from the mildest liberal reform to the most radical reduction of gender to insignificance. Difference can mean anything from Mary Daly’s belief in the natural superiority of women to psychoanalytic theories of how women are inevitably cast as “the Other” because they lack penises.105 Clearly, even within two polarized categories - equality and difference feminism - there are still more opportunities for polarization and disagreement. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Linda Alcoff, “Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory,” 13. 105 Ann Snitow, “A Gender Diary,” in Conflicts in Feminism, 26. 51 It is clear from Alcoff’s essay and from the essays in Conflicts in Feminism that this issue is deeply troubling for feminists who are committed to an academic and logically sound feminism that is rooted in reality: A subjectivity that is fundamentally shaped by gender appears to lead irrevocably to essentialism, the posing of a male/female opposition as universal and ahistorical. A subjectivity that is not fundamentally shaped by gender appears to lead to the conception of a generic human subject, as if we could peel away our ‘cultural’ layers and get to the real root of human nature, which turns out to be genderless. Are these really our only choices?106 I argue that they are not the only choices, and that both cultural feminism and poststructuralist feminism adhere to and even depend fundamentally on an underlying and flawed liberation from essence view. The problem with the liberation from essence view, as it is found in both cultural feminism and poststructuralist feminism, is that, in dealing with issues of broader social and political relevance, it ultimately places the individual’s autonomy and subjectivity as the highest moral good. Whether it follows the cultural feminist line of thinking, which views women’s interests and men’s interests in opposition to each other and does not presuppose or allow for any mutual interests or synergy beyond the individual woman or man’s happiness, or the poststructuralist feminist’s view of denying the category of “woman” in the first place, neither view takes larger societal goods into consideration. Neither view considers a purpose outside of the individual’s own identity, self-definition in relation to community or tradition, and subjective experience in the world. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 106 Linda Alcoff, “Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory,” 16. 52 While such views may have value in a therapeutic or psychological setting, they are destructive ways to view social interactions and to interpret one’s role in society and relationships and duties to others. Cultural feminism sees masculinity and femininity as “at war,” and can be traced to the type of matriarchal feminism promoted by Charlotte Perkins Gilman, while poststructuralist feminism faces serious logical inconsistencies that threaten to eliminate the notion of women in the first place. Hoff Sommers’ offers a more classical liberal and moderate feminism centered on freedom and individual liberties. Thus, we have three primary schools of feminist thought to consider. There are the two that are accepted on the left: poststructuralist feminism and cultural (matriarchal) feminism. Then there is the more right leaning blend of freedom and maternal feminism promoted by Hoff Sommers. This chapter has identified the difficulties that contemporary feminists face in attempting to develop an underlying philosophical impetus for the movement; next I will consider how they are addressing feminism as an academic discipline with a role in educational institutions.

### Cap Links – Identity Politics

#### Neoliberalism must be addressed before the aff’s identity politics—their performance only gets coopted by the capitalist system otherwise

**Pook 18** (Zooey Sophia, “QUEER IS THE NEW CAPITALISM: NEOLIBERAL TECHNOLOGIES AND A BLUEPRINT FOR THE LEFT BEYOND IDENTITY POLITICS,” Dissertation for a PhD in Philosophy, New Mexico State University)

Although Butler and company have made it clear that they do not wish to put the burden of social change on the backs of the least off, instead, carefully relegating their actions as potential strategies for academics, there does at least seem to be a kind of sensationalism that appears, at the very least, as an effect of such inquiries. Similarly, it is important to note efforts taken by Butler to delegitimize the flimsy perceptions of agency drawn from Gender Trouble that were addressed, most notably, in Bodies That Matter, and through the addition of her concept of precarity, which I will specifically address in the following chapter. In Bodies that Matter, Butler reiterates and strengthens her claim that performativity is not a matter of personal choice but of a subject already decided through the repetition/regularization of cultural norms (p. x). In Dispossession, performativity is compounded by the notion of precarity and the ways different bodies are specifically dispossessed in relation to neoliberal power. But even with these updates and nuances, the central tenants and problems of performativity and performative transgression remain, as does the impact of Gender Trouble, whether read thoughtfully or otherwise. This is the reason that I took the time to offer evidence of the specificities of the kinds of performative being done- so a reasonable analysis could be made about the ethics and effectiveness of performativity and identity-based politics when considering the situations of queer bodies. For the majority of women and gender studies students privileged and 62 educated enough to make sense of these works, reading about poor transgender inmates and impoverished queer people of color, for example, written by presumably safe and comfortable academics, lends itself to a kind of utopian thinking where the revolution is to come from a distressed and magical “other” at the deepest and darkest margins of our culture. And this is obvious enough if you’ve spent any time in a cultural studies department or in an LGBT center on most college campuses in the United States, as much excitement is generated from the possibilities of queer bodies serving as resistance tools. One should not underplay the excitement they had the first time reading Judith Butler as an undergrad, after all. In response, I think it is fair to say that queer theorists engaged in these projects would echo something not unlike Patricia Hill Collin’s (2004) defense of feminist standpoint theory- that it is more about the social conditions that a group faces than individual experiences (p. 247), but it is hard not to see how the damage is done. This is why Uma Naryan (2004) warns theorists of acquiring a kind of “double vision” where we transfer some kind of magical notions of truth and revolutionary knowledge to those who are most oppressed by the social forces and institutions we pit ourselves against (p. 233). This is an ironic twist because it seems not unlike the high theory equivalent of figures like “the magical negro” and others who have been well noted by cultural theorists as minority figures in works of popular culture who exist solely to advance the white narrative of a film, often completely devoid and separate from the logic of the film (Glenn, 2009). These are important points to consider because of the condition of LGBT+ people in the United States and in the world, as transgender people, 63 specifically, face enormous wealth disparities and are the target of murder on a quite disproportionate level (Longo, 2017). The challenges and institutional hardships of LGBT+ people are, of course, also exacerbated for LGBT+ people of color and for women, especially non-cisgender women. What should be raised at this point, are serious questions of ethics- both of the researcher in engaging such populations for political and strategic purposes and for readers and activists interested in drawing tactical conclusions from, or in tandem, with the group of inquiry. If we compare the previous works mentioned to similar works in Sociology, for examples, such as Unspeakable Love: Gay and Lesbian Life in the Middle East or Kristen Schilt and Laurel Westbrook’s “Doing Gender, Doing Heteronormativity: ‘Gender Normal’s,’ Transgender People and the Social Maintenance of Heteroesexuality,” we see much more careful attempts to make light of sensitive issues such as gay and lesbian experience in the middle east, violence towards transgender women, and the experience of transgender men in the workplace, followed by pragmatic examination of policy and law and their possibilities. This is far removed from the kind of sensationalizing or drawing undo political consequence or importance from the other’s body or experiences, despite being analysis bom of the same kind of inquiry and concern. Beyond what Hill-Collins proclaims about examining the shared social conditions of a group, it is more worthwhile to turn to the conditions of power themselves, as doing so will reveal a shift in the forms and distributions of neoliberal power, and more importantly, the changing technologies through which our lives are mediated. At such a time, identity politics will really be beside the point, and 64 performativity will need to be reassessed as a process of digital appropriation. Queer theorists have long been engaged in a kind of project to flesh out Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, acknowledging that while all bodies are disciplined by institutions and social formations of the state, they aren’t done so equally. Here, each scholar takes a turn yelling out a different minority group to which the specific particularities of oppression will be examined, along with the possibilities of resistance that coincide. It is probably long past time to turn back and diagnose power again; things have changed. Ironically, Foucault did this in very meaningful ways in his later work, arguing powerfully against self-identification and distinctions of gender and sexual identity he saw as problematically developing in the aftermath of ’68 (1978). It is, after all, one of Foucault’s major accomplishments, from his very earliest works, to illuminate the connection between the emergence of positive knowledge of human bodies and the corresponding institutional techniques that would follow to manage them (Behrent, 2013, p. 77). Now, it is neoliberalism in full bloom, and its technologies of appropriation that we must address against identity-based political resistances. The kind of compelled disclosure that Foucault draws a history of in the confessional and in medicine is now a relation of culture; it is decentralized and surrounds us, comprising our activity on the internet and between each other. The expectation of offering or being asked for a preferred pronoun in the transgender community is a serious example of this. Such an expectation transcends trust and autonomy thus reproducing the demands of information capital, rather than allowing identity to emerge or to not emerge on one’s own terms. Shannon Winnubst’s (2012) 65 work, for example, which utilizes the work of Foucault from this period to draw critique of the new ontological condition that neoliberalism produces is a useful and important work linking identity studies to postfordist being is particularly necessary in cultural studies, as is transcends the gap between technology, micro and macro political concerns, and locates neoliberal power via their connection

#### The AFF’s identity politics only serve as a distraction from challenging capitalism—and even worse, the distraction does nothing to solve for structural inequalities at all.

**Pook 18** (Zooey Sophia, “QUEER IS THE NEW CAPITALISM: NEOLIBERAL TECHNOLOGIES AND A BLUEPRINT FOR THE LEFT BEYOND IDENTITY POLITICS,” Dissertation for a PhD in Philosophy, New Mexico State University)

Identity politics have altered the way we speak about politics and in what ways. Neoliberalism does not employ the exclusionary tactics of the disciplinary age, but embraces diversity and inclusion as a means to neutralize hostis and to flatten 94 identity into a singular postfordist way of being. Discipline today is an interpersonal tool of neoliberal culture, in which individuals may take up the baton of political correctness and become an honorary member of the p.c. police, challenging inflammatory and discriminatory language, while also serving the goals of neoliberal order. Dean (2009) writes, quoting Zizek, The true victory (the true ‘negation of the negation’) occurs when the enemy talks your language. In this sense, a true victory is a victory in defeat. It occurs when one’s specific message is accepted as a universal ground, even by the enemy, (p. 7) The true victory of the post-1968 Left is the instatement of a universal language of neoliberal multiculturalism. Is this not what presents itself in all facets of culture today? A superficial respect of difference is afforded and policed omnipotently. A TV host makes a racist or sexist comment and he is fired. A store clerk tells a transgender woman she can’t use a restroom and the store is boycotted and put out of business. A movie does not promote women in the right way and it’s written about in a well-read blog and it flops in theaters. Meanwhile, the institutional injustices suffered by queer, black, and female bodies remain untouched. Identity politics serve neoliberalism because they orient us towards pacifism, and a focus on interpersonal abuses, reducing politics to speech, and directing us away from the functions of economics and politics. What identity politics have effectively served to create is an impotent language of multiculturalism that privileges victimhood and orients the disenfranchised toward superficial battles rather than towards direct action, subversion, and violence. Dean (2009) explains, 95 The position of victim (rather than victor) grows out of a prominent strain of contemporary American politics, namely, the rights discourse associated with movements for civil rights, women’s rights, and the rights of sexual minorities.7 Although often linked to left political correctness, speaking as a victim is at odds with the long history of the labor movement as well as with the politics of the new left. One need but recall a whole series of claims to power: ‘Black power,’ ‘Sisterhood is powerful,’ ‘We’re here; we’re queer; get used to it,’ ‘Power to the people.’ Reducing political speech to testimony to the suffering of victims inverts these claims to power and subverts the movements’ activist spirit, (p. 5) The discourse of victimhood does not produce institutional change. It produces social milieus. Today’s identity politics are vacuous. They have been reduced by neoliberal technologies to a microcosm of what they once were. Today’s “social justice warriors” are self-aggrandizing, going through the motions, and their digital protests are in direct symmetry with the emptiness of academic social critique. Frances Lee’s widely circulated (2017) blog article, “Kin Aesthetics: Excommunicate Me From the Church of Social Justice” mirrors LaTour’s (2004) critique of cultural studies, evidencing that identity politics movements today have become a divisive lifestyle which uncritically promote elitist and superficial language/analysis and attachment to “sacred texts” that fail to meaningfully challenge capitalist logics. When once Stokely Carmichael (1967) called for direct action and violence, citing the ways that civil rights movements become coopted, today #BlackLivesMatter is a savvy political brand aimed at shaping the modem platform of the Democratic Party, unconcerned with neoliberal imperialism (Dixon, 2015). When transgender women once threw bricks at the Stonewall Inn and physically defended themselves against police bmtality, today the LGBT+ movement musters its collective force to fail movies that 96 don’t adequately address the perception of their history (Smith, 2015). Identity politics have become problematic, as social justice warriors might say. Neoliberal technologies are particularly good at orienting us towards digital milieus. Identity politics have become hashtags and Facebook arguments. They have become circulation; more information capital lost in the flow on neoliberal networks. Jodi Dean (2009) explains her notion of circulation, Any particular contribution remains secondary to the fact of circulation. The value of any particular contribution is likewise inversely proportionate to the openness, inclusiveness, or extent of a circulating data stream: the more opinions or comments that are out there, the less of an impact any given one might make (and the more shocking, spectacular, and new a contribution must be in order to register or have an impact). In sum, communication functions symptomatically to produce its own negation, (p. 26) Today, issues of social justice and culture are taken up in endless ways on the internet by ever fracturing groups of individuals, constantly reimagining their space, positionality, and identity. Social media, blogs, group pages, and more direct lines of communication swell with hashtags, petitions, and arguments lined with a language of social justice ripe with lingo and abbreviation specific to the causes of internet activists. They remain detached from means of power and economics, and are instead easily swept into the currents of network, producing ever more information capital for the system they wish to challenge. The internet is a cozy and comfortable place for the disenfranchised to dump their proclivities for change. The Invisible Committee (2007) writes of activists organizations as “empty structures, which, in spite of their grand origins, can never be filled. In all their affairs, at every level, these organizations are concerned above all with their own survival as organizations, and 97 little else,” but “Far more dreadful are social milieus, with their supple texture, their gossip, and their informal hierarchies. Flee all milieus. Each and every milieu is oriented towards the neutralization of some truth” (p. 100). Digital milieus are no different: they form a language, a culture, sublimate a revolutionary message, and finally, punish and attack anyone who fails to perform their message the way they have deemed to be fashionable. These milieus and fractioned identity politics groups fail to convert any particulars into a universal cause or coherent Left capable of challenging neoliberal power. They are divisive and often simply serve as a vehicle to dump one’s rightful fears and anger about social injustices, producing a hard sardony, as their digital contributions are appropriated and exchanged as information capital. Dean (2009) writes, Contestations today rarely employ common terms, points of reference, or demarcated frontiers. In our highly mediated communications environments we confront instead a multiplication of resistances and assertions so extensive as to hinder the formation of strong counterhegemonies. The proliferation, distribution, acceleration, and intensification of communicative access and opportunity result in a deadlocked democracy incapable of serving as a form for political change. I refer to this democracy that talks without responding as communicative capitalism, (p. 22) The digital milieus of identity politics cannot serve us. They fracture, rather than connect, and convert useful resentment against the system into circulation. They squander revolutionary potential. Digital milieus are the internet equivalent of activist organizations and thus exacerbate the already existent problems of management, exclusivity, and production, through the reach, scope, and capture of neoliberal technologies. 98 Identity politics and digital milieus converge with neoliberal technologies to orient us to nonviolence, toward issues of culture rather than institutional awareness, and toward matters of the interpersonal, because this is what is achievable via the method of digital milieus and the internet, such as through petitions, social media, etc. Identity politics are particularly attuned and skilled in making it known that a particularly movie might be racist or even that an act of police brutality has occurred, but not in highlighting or addressing the ways in which systems function. Digital milieus, in short, orient us to matters of subjective, rather than objective violence. Slavoj Zizek (2008) explains the difference, as The catch is that subjective and objective violence cannot be perceived from the same standpoint: subjective violence is experienced as such against the background of a non-violent zero level. It is seen as a perturbation of the ‘normal,’ peaceful state of things. However, objective violence is precisely the violence inherent to this ‘normal’ state of things. Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent. Systemic violence is thus something like the notorious ‘dark matter’ of physics, the counterpart to an all-too-visible subjective violence. It may be invisible, but it has to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise seem to be ‘irrational’ explosions of subjective violence, (p. 2) Digital identity politics address egregious shows of force that emerge and appear on top of the regular functions of economics, politics, and our daily routines, which disappear in mundanity. We can stop a bill from passing that would victimize transgender women, or get a cop put on trial for killing an unarmed black man, but identity politics cannot address the imperial and domestic violence of capitalism; it cannot impede the rhythm of empire. Politics are thus reduced to subjectivized dilemma, and often reduced further to the smallest microcosm of interpersonal 99 interaction since internet technologies allow even the most ordinary civilian to hold a lens at all places and times in the public sphere. Identity politics becomes lost in the exchange of all things that the neoliberal shift from capital as wage relation to social relation produced. Digital milieus cannot challenge the flows of information and capital in network because it is contributing to them through the conversion of their revolutionary anger to circulation. However, I would like to consider what form resistance might take to disturb and counteract the flows of empire. In the following section I will examine what kind of force might make way against the objective violence and processes of desubjectivation through which neoliberalism sustains itself. I will attempt to offer solutions.

### Cap Impact

#### **Sustained global capitalism ensures nuclear escalation, magnifies local conflicts, and intensifies inequalities**

Hrubec and Uhde 18- The research of guest editors of this thematic issue was made in the framework of the research programme “Global Conflicts and Local Interactions”, Strategy AV21, The Czech Academy of Sciences. https://sci-hub.se/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0896920518798880?journalCode=crsb

The contemporary changes make global conflicts and local interactions increasingly interconnected. The local problem can spread rapidly globally, and global problems can interfere in many local communities. Diverse global conflicts have a strong influence on local social dynamics; at the same time, local processes, especially in hegemonic geopolitical macro-regions, shape the global political and economic order. Today’s problems have crystallized as a result of various technological, economic, political, social, cultural and other global interactions over the long history of human civilization which have not been sufficiently processed and integrated into the systemic framework of local, regional and national structures and the global civilizational system, nor into theoretical research analyses. While colonial history lies deep in the roots of many contemporary problems, today the main power behind the perpetuation of systemic and structural causes of inequalities and injustice is global capitalism, with the related processes of the exploitation and marginalization of various world macro-regions and hegemonic war conflicts. Critical research into global conflicts and local interactions brings to the fore mutual relations between diverse issues such as military escalation, wars, transnational migration, poverty, exploitation, displacement and social expulsion, transnational corporations, gender and racial inequalities, etc., and opens up horizons for the normative issues of struggling for global justice and peace, reshaping democracy and citizenship in a post-national constellation and new economic paradigms compatible with civilizational and ecological developments. The challenge faced by social research into global conflicts is that analyses need to be directed not only at security studies, but also and principally at the complex sources and causes of wars and other contemporary problems, mainly in the form of the subtle economic, political, and cultural practices of global capitalism which lie behind armed conflicts. These analyses are also the first step towards resolving conflicts. In other words, we can say that analyses of “hard power” should be supplemented and redefined by analyses focused on “soft power”, that is, on the economic, political and other forces which condition the first kind of force. The subject of global conflicts in relation to their local interactions has not been researched systematically much yet, although global conflicts, on the one hand, and various related local economic, political, and cultural processes, on the other, have received separate attention from numerous researchers. It is important to start with the premise that global conflicts and their local interactions constitute fundamental challenges for social research and also future possibilities of positive social interactions. This premise transforms the perspective from which individual issues and territorial analyses are approached. Existing studies have shown that, while territorial integration processes have lasted on our planet for millennia, and globalizing processes have continued since the expansion of Europeans into the Americas 500 years ago, a majority of authors associate the notion of global interactions primarily with accelerated globalization since the end of the 1980s. Challenges faced by social research into global interactions place new demands on analyses of conflictual transnationalization in late modern societies and on cosmopolitan claims in a transdisciplinary approach (Fine, 2007; Jaggar, 2014; Beck, 2016). A precondition for these analyses is consideration of the current crisis tendencies of global capitalism which could prove deeper in the long run than the structural crisis of 2008 (Robinson, 2014). The deeper characteristics of these crisis tendencies indicate trends which may lead not only to structural crisis, but also to a crisis of the whole system. The past structural crises of the world system seriously polarized relations between social groups and classes, damaged the economic basis, and weakened or delegitimized state authority, with consequences for the restructuring of the capitalist system. Such restructuring made possible the revitalization of the collapsed economy, politics, and society within the system. The main cause of the current crisis is over-accumulation because global production and trade heavily increased accumulation in the past few decades. Current problematic trends are defined by environmental limits, global social and economic inequalities, social control and militarized tendencies, the territorial limits to the expansion of the contemporary order, the population creating surplus labor, and political contradictions between the nation states and transnational arrangements in the era of global capitalism (Harris, 2016; Sklair, 2016). The thematic symposium in this issue follows research and its international cooperation within a new transdisciplinary research programme “Global Conflicts and Local Interactions” at the Czech Academy of Sciences in Prague. The research team focuses not only on armed conflicts, but also on economic, political, social, and cultural conflicts and their local interlinks with regard to particularism and universalism and also with regard to interactions between global, macro-regional, national and local orders. It contributes to critical analyses of the contemporary society and the complex thematic issue of glocal interactions (Fasenfest, 2010; Hrubec, 2012). Nevertheless, this special thematic symposium cannot analyze all the relevant topics within the thematic area of global conflicts and local interactions. It addresses three important aspects in particular: first, militarized escalation leading to the global police state and threat of nuclear war; second, the complex intertwinement of transnational societal challenges anchored in contradictions of the current global system; third, problematic issues and the positive potential of civil society in Western countries and in sub-Saharan Africa. Militarized Escalation, Transnationalization, and Civil Developments First, militarized escalation by means of current global repressive tendencies is linked to the transformation of the police and war. While the global order as a whole develops step by step in specific local and national conditions, at the same time the militarization of local and national places is Hrubec and Uhde 3 closely interlinked to macro-regional involvement in the webs of transnational and global war conflicts (Robinson, 2018). A locally created problem in the main global superpower, the USA, can easily spread globally. Even if the USA is declining power, its leading economic and political groups, in collaboration with other transnational capital groups, have still played a leading role in the domination of the world via militarily channels on the global level. The militarization of the economy and society is rooted particularly in the events of 11 September 2001, and has led to global interactions that connect the military and security complex with industrial and political trends in a specific dangerous way (Hristov, 2014; Paley, 2014). These repressive tendencies have led to the establishment of a global police state. Because of the new political and economic trends in the USA and their intense conflictual integration within global capitalism, there are high risks of military escalation, with dangerous lethal consequences for societies (Hrubec, 2016). The current impulses for the nuclear threat and related problems are formulated in new strategic documents of the US administration, particularly in the National Security Strategy and the Nuclear Posture Review. Political statements based on these and other documents open up the possibility of the real use of nuclear weapons in a limited nuclear war. Highly advanced electronic systems, containing transnational communication with big data, developed high-precise weapon systems and other tools, also allow for the application of nuclear weapons on a very specific territorial scale. On the basis of new technologies, political and economic actors have revitalized the possibility of nuclear war, and the establishment of Donald Trump in the White House has opened a real threat of “thinking the unthinkable”, i.e. a real nuclear conflict. Even if the hypothesis for nuclear war cannot be proven before the war breaks out, the highly dangerous military, economic, and political tendencies potentially leading to this kind of war are sufficient reason to pay attention to this serious problem. In the long history of human civilization, people have always misused the most developed technological innovations in wars. There is a serious probability that we are not at the end of history, when the people would stop doing that. This is why it is important to help to contain this kind of threat by analyzing it (Lodgaard, 2010). Second, the thematic area of global conflicts and local interactions places a spotlight on the transnationalization of social and other processes and relations. While these intertwined aspects of the contradictions of global capitalism are often examined separately, their analyses require research into complex interconnections and the common causes of local and global problems, which is also a necessary first step in articulating potential remedies and normative requirements for global justice. The analytical lens of global interactions also sheds light on the changing role of the nation state, and problematizes the commonly accepted premise equating society with the political unit of a nation state. The gap between the global interconnectedness of social processes, on the one hand, and efforts to address arising social conflicts at the level of nation states and internationally organized political institutions, on the other hand, is prevalent not only in real politics, but also in the current social sciences (Beck, 2016). Asking fundamental contemporary questions thus calls for a different methodological approach, which is linked to transnational inquiry. The main focuses are on the transnational intertwinement of social and environmental contradictions that are manifested in various conjunctions in global crises, risks, and conflicts, and on transnational migration, which is an exemplary case of interdependent problems, be they economic, social, political, cultural, or environmental. The profit-oriented global system creates social and environmental risks that are unequally distributed. Nevertheless, they pose a challenge for everybody on the planet. While from a short-term perspective the transnational ruling groups benefit from the planetary plundering of natural resources, labor precarisation, exploitation and expulsion, and sharpening social and economic inequalities, their adaptation to these social conflicts and crises induces the further multiplication and cumulation of destructive consequences to a point that) poses a threat to the current system and even to the sustainability of human life on the planet (Sassen, 2014). These are the fundamental limits of the current system

# AfroPess vs. Fem IR Aff

### Link – Vulnerability

#### The aff’s insistence that we should all “embrace vulnerability” overcodes the way black vulnerability is manifest constantly as abjection––it relies on antiblack grammars of relationality centered around the Human

Mukasa **Mubirumusoke** 20**22** [Assistant Professor in the Intercollegiate Department of Africana Studies at Claremont McKenna College “Black Hospitality A Theoretical Framework for Black Ethical Life” https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95255-6]//sheima

We all share in vulnerability argues Butler, even on this global geopolitical scale and it’s rooted in a ‘social vulnerability.’ **Against Butler’s idea of a shared ‘social vulnerability’,** this chapter argues human vulnerability in its various guises and comparable quantifications is not of the same quality as black vulnerability. Black vulnerability is of a different kind then even the extreme vulnerability Butler identifies as imposed by the war on terror. Black vulnerability has an abject quality because of its non-relationality that expels the experience of black people from the realm of the human by means of an objectifying violence. ¶ The extralegal policies issued by the United States state department seemingly defy all modern legal precedence domestically and internationally, culminating in the practice of indefinite detention at Guantanamo Bay—which still holds thirty-nine people as of January 2022. And yet, these conditions still discursively refer to a human subject insomuch as these persons retain some form of cultural historical integrity and a political ontology that can identify and punish transgressions of its normative orders, even if these transgressions are generally seen as acceptable by a broader human coalition. Undeniably a shared vulnerability of the human gets manipulated and contorted to produce an intensification of vulnerability for the brown, deceitful, ‘terrorist’, both abroad and in the United States. The profound degradation of the Middle Eastern person, however, is not the same as the abject black object and this distinction must be considered beyond the discourses of colorblindness, protest size, or even the unfathomable unconstitutional practices of the US government toward an entire religion and region post 9/11.¶ “This chapter began by recounting black experience at the beginning of the twenty-first century not merely because it describes a black vulnerability that overlaps temporally with the hostility toward Middle Easterners, which is the signature of the never-ending war on terror that framed Butler’s reflections of vulnerability. Indeed, these two historical examples are worthy of comparison for their temporal overlap and conceptual distinction, but also a look at the beginning of the twenty-first century and the right ‘now’ for black people also calls attention to an eerie repetition of the same, whereby the spectacular horror of violence that is attached to the names Trayvon, Tamir; Taylor, Floyd, seem all too familiar and even now more than ever seem almost necessary for the functioning of the political order of America, even if it is not clear why. In describing the peculiarity of black (political) vulnerability this chapter will also need to address what appears to be this compulsion of antiblack violence and the spectacle that obscures it. Butler’s reimagination of subjectivity through vulnerability is an attempt to reform the ethico-political presumptions that encourage individualism, nationalism, and dichotomous self-constructions, suggesting American aggression and Middle Eastern resentment are notes in the same chord. The concept of vulnerability supposedly can unveil the harmony of humanity even when its violent hypocrisies are loudest. Yet the hostility toward blacks and their vulnerability resonates in a different key; the interminable ‘war on terror’ is different from the positionality of the slave that must be reaffirmed regardless of, and illegible to, more prominent narratives in American political discourse and political economy.¶ Through the lens of afropessimism, Frank Wilderson III and Jared Sexton—along with others—allow us to conceptualize the uniqueness of black vulnerability, or rather its illegibility and objectifying nature, over and against the spectrum of shared political vulnerability described by Butler and others. The key to understanding black vulnerability and its extraordinary character is a notion of social death—which will be recategorized as political death in the next chapter—that positions black people not merely at the edge but on the outside and antagonistic to a political community that is structured by antiblack white supremacy. Wilderson provides the most comprehensive conception of black social death working primarily from, with modification, Orlando Patterson’s definition in the seminal work Slavery and Social Death, in addition to inspiration from Frantz Fanon, Saidiya Hartman, and Hortense Spillers. Through social death, black people occupy a positionality—not a subjective identity—that refuses legibility as human. This is accomplished under the parameters of dishonor, natal alienation, and gratuitous violence. The black positionality is unique in its’ non-relation to all other positionalities inasmuch as its degradation is an absolute abjection, in other words modern political ontology denies all relationality to black people. It is not contingently maintained through possible transgressions, but structurally constitutive through negation in the formation of proper political subjectivity, from the most valued to the least valued political subjects. Social death as abjection is necessary to maintain the world of the human. Jared Sexton offers the helpful description of a general economy to conceptualize the excess and need for repetition as a non-rational affective investment in the abjection of black people. From these perspectives emerges a concept of black vulnerability that goes beyond Butler’s homogenized conceptualization of a collective ontological vulnerability. Through a loss of what was never there, a loss that is gratuitously reified through repetition, we can better understand what is specific to antiblack violence. David Marriott employs the term abjection to signify a loss that was never present (Marriott 2007, 123).¶ Gratuity compliments abjection, as it explains the excessive repetition of antiblack violence, since there are no legible norms to be transgressed in a loss that was never present and thus no ultimate rationality or foundation to rest on except bare assertion. As Wilderson describes in the first chapter of Red, White, and Black: “This (gratuitous ) violence which turns a body into flesh, ripped apart literally and imaginatively, destroys the possibility of ontology because it positions the Black in an infinite and indeterminately horrifying open vulnerability, an object made available (which is to say fungible) for any subject. (Wilderson III 2010, 38; my emphasis) In describing black vulnerability as ‘infinite’, ‘indeterminate’, and ‘horrifyingly open’, Wilderson provides a conceptual framing and analytic undoing that demands rethinking who may belong to the spectrum of human vulnerability and what does not. This chapter next turns to an explication of the excessive ‘extra-ordinary’ nature of the illegible, fungible, accumulative, and abject object of blackness that characterizes black vulnerability.”¶ II. The General Economy of White Supremacy and Extra-ordinary Black Vulnerability Following in the spirit of Butler’s innovative refguring of subjectivity via vulnerability, Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds, in the introduction to their 2014 reader titled Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, also call for the displacement of the traditional role of rationality for describing the essence of humanity, proclaiming “Human life is conditioned by vulnerability” (Mackenzie et al. 2014, 1). While vulnerability may have universal applicability for human life, they argue it does not come in one standard universal form. They make a welcomed contribution to Butler’s intervention by breaking down vulnerability into a helpful taxonomy that situates the different ways it manifests itself through our materiality as needy bodies, through the social and affective nature of our being open to others through grief, humiliation, or through our socio-political nature as open to exploitation and oppression. Also, vulnerability can emerge from a different variety of sources, that is, inherent, situational, or pathogenic, as well as exist in different states, that is, dispositional or occurrent.¶ These distinctions are constructive and yet limited when it comes to black people. Under this rubric, the experience of black vulnerability would fall under an occurrent state, meaning that it is not a matter of dispositional possibility of becoming vulnerable, for example, some physical disabilities, but rather black vulnerability is manifest constantly. Furthermore, its source would be pathogenic entailing a systematic oppression that is not simply inherited by means of being human or strictly situational. Makenzie, Rogers, and Dodds explain, “a key feature of pathogenic vulnerability is the way that it undermines autonomy or exacerbates the sense of powerlessness engendered by vulnerability in general” (Mackenzie et al. 2014, 9). At first glance their taxonomy appears more than sufficient to account for black vulnerability. Black vulnerability would be one among many forms of occurrent and pathogenic conditions that plague a plethora of identities that fall short of the generally accepted zero-sum position of white cisgender heterosexual ablebodied bourgeois men. However, there is a marked difference for the experience of black people: their autonomy and ‘sense of power’, at least as traditional subjects, is not undermined but illegible because of an original lack of political ontological stature. Singularly, the pathology that characterize black vulnerability is abjection, whereby black people are banished from the metrics of humanity that would render their suffering, and therefore their vulnerability, irrational, that is beyond sublation, and non-relational.¶ Perhaps the most insidious component of black vulnerability from a philosophical perspective follows from the fact that antiblackness elides any appeal to an ultimate justification or rationality. When confronted with the machinations of antiblackness in everyday life, for example, with hate crimes, police brutality, disproportionate wages, and so on, these manifestations at first appear as if they can make sense in some larger context or rationale. As if there is some identifiable reason why black people deserve repercussion, as if they had transgressed some cultural normative arrangement or even economic preserving ideology. These racist ‘events’ appear in a taxonomy of violence that point toward antiblackness, but what if the underlying justification beyond their expression from a restricted perspective escapes any ultimate justification or rationality beyond the bare assertion of black abjection? We may say that Michael Brown would be alive if he had not stolen from that convenient store (if indeed that was the case), if he were not poor (although this too of course plays a role), if he had not charged like ‘the Hulk’, if he were not jay walking, but those ancillary reasons only obscure the reality that his violation ultimately needs no reason. It was not simply a ‘sense of powerlessness’ or lack of autonomy, but instead abject inhumanness, his non-relationality, that brought him to the alter for sacrifice in the name of white supremacy. His blackness made him vulnerable beyond belief—or, to be more specific, only on the grounds of belief—because it was his blackness that brought Darren Wilson to that neighborhood, as with many other officers, and it was his blackness that turned the 18-year-old into the Hulk, it was blackness that turned 12-year-old Tamir Rice into an armed and dangerous adult, it was blackness that turned Rodney King’s shielding forearms into aggressive pursuit and falling pants into sexual assault.¶ Jared Sexton articulates the structure of a ‘libidinal economy of white supremacy’ using the insightful heuristic of the general economy. The libidinal economy refers to the affective and subconscious desires and investments that informs one’s self-identifications. For ‘white supremacy’ these are the arrangement and distribution of desires and affects, positive or negative, that support the formation of any identity over against blackness. Now, a general economy challenges the logic of traditional economic models that are considered essentially rationalized laws of exchange, since its grounding principle is instead exuberant expenditure, without any ultimate reason. Sexton describes white supremacy as a general economy in the 2003 essay co-authored with Steve Martinot titled “The Avant-Garde of White Supremacy,” but he explores the concept with greater depth and by name in his 2008 book Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism. While in the former essay he uses the term ‘hyper economy’, in the latter he uses the term general economy explicitly, citing Arkady Plotnitski’s Reconfgurations as his source. For this discussion, however, it is worth considering the more familiar, and the inspiration of Plotniski’s analysis in his book, twentieth-century French theorist and eroticist Georges Bataille.

#### The weaponization of Black vulnerability for the political agendas of junior partners sustains a bottomless well of antiblack violence

Mukasa **Mubirumusoke** 20**22** [Assistant Professor in the Intercollegiate Department of Africana Studies at Claremont McKenna College “Black Hospitality A Theoretical Framework for Black Ethical Life” https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95255-6]//sheima

This is not to imply that there is not class difference among black people. The black people listed at the beginning of the chapter as so-called beacons of progress do indeed live a much different life than the poor and working-class victims of violence that were named soon after (although a few of the former did not always live with money and may not continue in the future. There are real consequences for these class distinctions; for example, Skip Gates ultimately had a beer summit with the first black president after his confrontation with a police officer; meanwhile, Brionna Taylor did not even get a knock at the door before her demise. These different class experiences cannot be conflated and the black poor and working classes experience life differently, but that experience does attend to the ontological. The few black Americans that owned slaves, for instance, were not whitened; they had more money. Nevertheless, they were always vulnerable in a way that was not the same as even the poorest white people who may indeed perish from the consequences of their poverty. The qualitative distinction between white and black exceeds calculations and again only an appeal to the general economy of white supremacy can make sense of this distinction. The vulnerability of any proletariat can be overcome through hard work (some harder than others), but black vulnerability at the ontological level—which includes sudden death for no reason at all except the fact that one is black—cannot be ultimately mitigated by labor regardless of the neighborhood. Therefore, while it may not be the literal case that black people can be purchased as chattel slaves in 2020 (although the conditions in Libya may challenge even this contention), the nonrelation of blackness as vulnerable to anyone was set by a diremption between black and non-black centuries ago and this antagonism is constituted by the extra-ordinary, that is, illegible, accumulative, fungible, abject, objectifcation, and the open vulnerability that follows from it. From a materialist perspective, it is often argued that racism and sexism are used to obscure true class relations and create inessential hierarchies and intraclass confict. A Marxist or class critique may indeed allow one to see the exploitation at work behind the hypnotic light of our computer screens, but will that unmask the ‘ugliness’ of the affective economy and larger ethical dilemma of white supremacy? Let’s hear Wilderson explain in his own words: Anti-black violence is vital to the psychic well-being of White (and nonBlack) people everywhere. Violence against black people provides a sanctuary for White people, a guaranteed matrix of safety, security, and respite—respite from the otherwise unbearable hydraulics of their own family lives, and from the unbearable hydraulics of an ugly world that they have created and which they know, in the collective unconscious, to be ugly, though they can’t bring themselves to admit it is beyond redemption. (Wilderson III 2015, 148) Antiblack violence is vital in maintaining the hierarchy of the antiblack world, but as the parenthetical term intimates, the human also extends to those non-blacks, which Wilderson identifes as the ‘junior members’ of white civil society (Wilderson III 2007, 26) and who may also attend to the bottomless well of anti-blackness for their own constitution. These junior members are the familiar marginal political groupings, whether they be other people of color, other categories of identity regarding gender, sexual orientation, or even the  previously discussed political economic positions, such as the worker. It is hard not to recognize that this sort of malleability in terms of self-fortifcation is once again an attribute of the excessive economy of white supremacy as the gift that keeps on giving. In contemporary times we see the proliferation of identities that make claim to their marginal status over against the status quo and their legibility is not just symbolic differentiation. This may indeed mark their legibility as a given ‘exceptional’ categorical possibility, but the vitality of their stature is enriched or stabilized by comparing and distinguishing from blackness. All these junior members participate in the fortification of white civil society, only marginally, but still by way of anti-blackness. This is indeed a polemical contention, but it need not be so reductively interpreted as a ranking. Rather, the constitutive primacy of antiblackness serves as a tracing of the conceptual landscape, whereby it becomes clear where the ever so replenishing life force of what we recognize as the human or civil society springs from. Wilderson provides a number of examples of how such parasitic anti-blackness arises in everyday life from junior members. For instance, in the previously cited “Prison Slave” essay he cites the sort of anti-black subjection that Assata Shakur describes in her biography via a white woman in the abolitionist movement, concluding, “The verisimilitude between Assata’s well known police encounters and her experience in civil society’s most nurturing nook, the radical coalition, raises disturbing questions about political desire, black positionality, and hegemony as a mode of struggle” (Wilderson III 2007, 24). One question may be: what are the limits of non-black prison abolitionists when it comes to sacrificing for the greater good? Carceral punishment for even the most heinous crimes appears to be one thing that must go with the abolition movement, but even then, antiblackness cannot help itself from flourishing even in the most radical places. Also, in another example of the ever-expanding list of who finds respite in antiblackness, one may turn back to the essay “Afro-Pessimism and the End of Redemption,” where Wilderson recalls a conversation with a Palestinian friend whose cousin had died constructing a bomb. The friend then confded, in a moment of unfiltered grief, that the humiliation of the full body searches conducted by Israeli soldiers was worse when it was an Ethiopian Jew. Wilderson goes on to explain: I was faced with the realization that, in the collective unconscious, the Palestinian insurgent has more in common with Israeli state and civil society than s/he does with Black people. What they share is a largely unconscious consensus that Blackness is a locus of abjection to be instrumentalized on a whim. At one moment Blackness is a disfigured and disfiguring phobic phenomenon; at another moment Blackness is a sentient implement to be joyously deployed for reasons and agendas that have little to do with Black liberation … My friend’s and his country’s women’s and men’s negrophobogensis, is the bedrock, the concrete slabs upon which any edifice of human articulation (whether love or war) is built. (Wilderson III 2016) Antiblackness necessarily shades even the ‘micro-aggressions’ in the examples of Assata and Wilderson’s friend above. The white prison abolitionist and the Palestinian insurgent can sense the absolute abjection of blackness, and they gesture toward it to give themselves a glimpse at their own humanity, however much degraded by the violence they are subjected to via contingent violation as opposed to the gratuitous violence that black people may meet at a whim. Black vulnerability is of the same quality as theirs. While black people and the junior members share the category of occurrent, it is not pathogenic in the way of undermining autonomy or exacerbating any sense of powerlessness through particular actions that circumscribe their subjection. Instead, it is a vulnerability that is abject, that is discursively illegible or without origin, objectifying, psychically replenishing, and fortified by the dominant and marginal constituents of civil society, gratuitously, that is, without reason or dialectical reconciliation. Black vulnerability marks the parameters of human or subjective capacity through a broad coalition of policing the contours of the human and hardly human in a collective unconscious of antiblackness.

### Link – Hegemonic Masculinity

#### Their invocation of the feminine/masculine dichotomy confines black women into the archive of gender founded upon humanist categories that renders the black gender silent

Mukasa **Mubirumusoke** 20**22** [Assistant Professor in the Intercollegiate Department of Africana Studies at Claremont McKenna College “Black Hospitality A Theoretical Framework for Black Ethical Life” https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95255-6]//sheima

When regarding the functioning of the spectacular, it also cannot go unmentioned that black cisgender men have garnered the most attention and although the considerations here will avoid focusing on any event in too much detail, it should be noted this group is not exclusively subject to such violence. Patrice D. Douglass gives a very nuanced reading of gender and afropessimism as it follows in the wake of Spillers’ invocation of (un)gendering and the fashion in which femininity and masculinity are misnamed and misrecognized under white supremacy. Douglass explains: Juxtaposing the hyper-visibility of the death of Black men against the invisibility and silencing of the death of Black women opens a litany of trap doors. Placing the lens on how Black women die is not to demand that visual images of their deaths are repeated on social media networks and the nightly news at the behest of the pleasure of viewing Black suffering. In fact, the issue of Black gender is more complex than the dichotomization of death. Furthermore, to bifurcate Black gender, Black women up against Black men, achieves nothing more than reifying gender stratifcations that historically and experientially have never been made available to Black people. By shifting perspective, we might ask, how Black feminist politics account for the dead and dying inclusive of all genders? (Douglass 2018, 108) ¶ This concluding call, asked of and inspired by black feminism, thus demands, not the dismissal of gendered violence, but rethinking the juxtaposition and ossifcation of such identities that are never afforded through proper terms of gender, since they are only created through a violence to separate these black identities from the political ontology of the human. Black (un)gendering thus exposes with greater depth the ways in which black vulnerability exceeds all principles and categories of the human. To refer to Douglass one more time at length she elaborates: ¶ The archive of gender is structurally anti-black. Its assumptive logic, whether explicit in its presentation or not, maintains that all women have the same gender. This orientation of thought does more than render Black gender invisible or silent. It makes it conceptually impossible to think of gender violence as orienting more than the realm of gender. Rather than engaging a politic fixated on what binds women together in life, I want to draw focus to what separates Black women in death. What creates the conditions of (im)possibility for Black women to die? (Douglass 2018, 115)¶ Humans die; meanwhile, black women are hailed into existence by a violence that only permits their perishing. This reality needs to be kept in mind when we are thinking of the phenomenon of police violence. Violence against black women should not be ignored, but an increased media presence does not bring about human recognition; their absence is part and parcel of an anti-black violence that imposes gender differently, though for a similar end, that is, social (and real) death. Wilderson falls in line with much of what Douglass explicates and suggests that the media focus on the carceral violence received by black men only serves the purpose of reifying spectacular violence and offering a false sense of agency through assuming the human categories of gender. Gender for black people is not essential, it is a ‘borrowed institutionality” instrumentalized in strategic ways. In the end, the actions of police brutality, inclusive of all genders, are not simply spontaneous or isolated acts of individual anger; they serve the ends of white civil society inasmuch as its constituents, while recognizing a certain horror in police brutality, feel safe from the fears and dread of its reality in the space where it belongs, namely in the black community. Moreover, there is also pleasure derived in the negrophilic dalliance of a weekend warrior protestor where their confrontation with police actually can be dignifying. These spectacular images show to many that the police are doing their job, which explains the ex post facto justifcations of these black people as criminals even though the criminal records that these victims might possess actually points to the criminalization of their livelihood, that is, the banality of white supremacy. Again, the spectacles obscure all of this and serve to provide a “vital cultural labor” (Sexton and Martinot 2003, 176) Or as Sexton and Martinot state explicitly:¶ White supremacy is not reconstructed simply for its own sake but for the sake of the social paranoia, the ethic of impunity, and the violent spectacles of racialization that it calls the “maintenance of order,” all of which constitute its essential dimensions. The cold, gray institutions of this society – courts, schools, prisons, police, army, law, religion, the two-party system – become the arenas of this brutality, its excess and spectacle, which they then normalize throughout the social field. (Sexton and Martinot 2003, 180)

### Link – Fem / Intersectionality

#### Intersectional feminist logic delegitimates the effect of ontological blackness as opposed to “epistemological masculinity.” Vulnerability is thus weaponized towards the creation of black-as-vessel, existent only for its cultural production Sirma Bilge 20 [Department of Sociology, The fungibility of intersectionality: an Afropessimist reading, <https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289>, March 23 2020, Accessed 7/5/22, <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289>, -ekh-]

Given the centrality of the concept of fungibility in my argument and its close ties to Afropessimism, it is worth starting by a succinct exposé of the latter’s central tenets. First things first, Afropessimism under consideration here is the US-version of Afropessimism, which was developed several decades after its original elaboration in Africa (with a different meaning) and largely obscured this prior conceptualization.[5](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289)

A foundational premise of (US-made) Afropessimism is the claim that humanity was “made legible through the irreconcilable distinction between humans and blackness” (Douglass, Terrefe, and Wilderson [2018](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289), 1). The advent of “human” as category was achieved through the violent negation of humanity to the Black, classified as non-human. This founding relationality in which the Black non-human is the constitutive outside of the Human means that Blackness eludes and exceeds the humanist modes of thinking and world-making. This premise is buttressed by the Afropessimist conceptualization of Blackness as “a paradigmatic position, rather than an ensemble of cultural, social, and sexual orientations” (1), as a “structural position of noncommunicability in the face of all other positions” (Wilderson [2010](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289), 58), which is coupled with a methodological refusal – that of any analogizing/comparison between the regimes of violence that discipline non-Black subalterns (dominated but human) and the one that evicts the Black from humanity. For Afropessimists, any analogizing between Black non-being and subjugated being (whether non-Black migrant, woman, queer, disabled) is misguided, as fungible object is incomparable to subordinated subject, and “the structure of the entire world’s semantic field – regardless of cultural and national discrepancies – […] is sutured by anti-Black solidarity” (58). One can hardly miss the divergence between this Afropessimist precept of incommensurable ontological (anti)Blackness, which foregrounds one true antagonism, the one between Black non-human and non-Black human, while it views “other repressive relations like class and gender” as taking place “on the level of conflict – they can be resolved, hence they are not ontological” (Wilderson [n.d](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289).), and the intersectional relational schema which, without treating differences as equivalent and interchangeable, conceives them within a matrix of domination where there is no superordinate antagonism. Thus, Afropessimist relational schema is hardly compatible with intersectional relational schema. While the former builds on the premise of only one true antagonism – that between humans and Blacks which is the core of ontological anti-Blackness – relegating the others to the realm of conflicts, because, it argues, they are not ontological, the latter eschews the idea of a single determination (be it race, class or gender) and focuses on theorizing their context-specific mutual constitution and articulations.

From an Afropessimist perspective, Blackness doesn’t belong to the domain of subjectivity, identity, agency and epistemology, but to that of ontology, accumulation and fungibility, as determined by slavery and its afterlife (Hartman [1997](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289)). What ensue are structural incommensurability and incommunicability of Blackness vis-à-vis all other subaltern positions, “predicated on modalities of accumulation and fungibility, not [Marxian] exploitation and alienation” (Wilderson [2010](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289), 58) – for slave is an object, not an exploited labourer-subject (Patterson [1982](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289)). They produce the “the absolute non-individuality and interchangeability” (Warren [2017](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289), 397) of Blackness. Here, the concept of fungibility is of paramount importance, as the predicate upon which the enslaved Black is evicted from humanity and turned into ontologically (ac)cumulable and exchangeable commodity. Hartman ([1997](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289)) argues:

the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values; and as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master's body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power. (21, my emphasis)

Slavery is determinant in the Afropessimist conceptualization of Blackness and its incommensurability with other social positions of oppression. For Afropessimists, “the black is positioned, a priori, as slave” (Douglass, Terrefe, and Wilderson [2018](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289), 1). One may reasonably inquire, but what about post-emancipation? Afropessimists answer this via the concept “afterlife of slavery” (Hartman [2007](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289)) to argue “how the relationship between the slave and their status as fungible property did not substantively change after emancipation” (King [2013](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289), 24). Hartman writes:

Slavery had established a measure of man and a ranking of life and worth that has yet to be undone. If slavery persists as an issue in the political life of black America, it is not because of an antiquarian obsession with bygone days or the burden of a too-long memory, but because black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago. This is the afterlife of slavery – skewed life chances, limited access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and impoverishment. I, too, am the afterlife of slavery. ([2007](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289), 6)

For Hartman, emancipation is “both a breach with slavery and a point of transition to what looks more like the reorganization of the plantation system than self-possession, citizenship, or liberty of the ‘freed’” ([1997](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289), 12). Accordingly, the plantation supersedes its historical site, so does the fungible object status of the ‘freed’ Black. The lingering effects of slavery have an important bearing on my argument about Black feminist intersectionality’s fungibility in present-day academe. If Hartman theorizes Black non-humanity as being predicated on fungibility, i.e. ontological status of infinitely cumulable and exchangeable commodity, from the structural position of the enslaved, her conception of slavery’s *afterlife* authorizes the deployments of fungibility after and beyond slavery. Such a post-emancipation use of fungibility is obvious in Wilderson’s work, when he argues:

As an accumulated and fungible object, rather than an exploited and alienated subject, Black is openly vulnerable to the whims of the world and so is his or her cultural ‘production.’ What does it mean – what are the stakes – when the world can whimsically transpose one’s cultural gestures, the stuff of symbolic intervention, onto another worldly good, a commodity of style? ([2010](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289), 56, my emphasis).

In so doing, Wilderson not only deploys fungibility beyond the historical site of slavery, but also expands it from Black bodies to their artistic and intellectual productions, which are up for grabs, to be done whatever anyone sees suitable. He writes:

The object status of Blackness means that it can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process. Both jazz and hip-hop have become known in the same way that Black bodies are known: as forces “liberated” from time and space, belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking. Anyone can say “[n-word]” because anyone can be a “[n-word].” ([2010](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289), 235, my emphasis)

Black fungibility under globalized hip-hop brings compelling insights to think through Black women’s fungibility under globalized intersectionality, which becomes intersectionality’s fungibility under globalized knowledge economy. In both cases (globalized hip-hop and intersectionality), Black bodies and intellectual/cultural production are in a state of infinite change and exchange. They are “open spaces of shifting ‘signification and representation’ which humans use to make meaning of their lives” (King [2016](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289), 1023; drawing on Spillers [1987](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1740289), 75). The enslaved body’s ontological status predicated on fungibility and accumulation hence expands on Black experience and knowledge, turning them into “an open sign that can be arranged and rearranged for infinite kinds of use” (1025).

### Link – PoMo

#### Postmodernism’s reconstruction of metaphysics is unable to come to terms with the necessity of blackness for function which inevitablizes humanist metaphysics absent an ontological terror Çalvin Warren 18 [Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Emory University, Ontological Terror, it’s a book, Duke University Press, “Introduction: The Free Black Is Nothing,” redacted for racialized language, -ekh-]

A deep abyss, or a terrifying question, engenders the declaration “Black Lives Matter.” The declaration, in fact, conceals this question even as it purports to have answered it resolutely. “Black Lives Matter,” then, carries a certain terror in its dissemination, a terror we dare to approach with uncertainty, urgency, and exhaustion. This question pertains to the “metaphysical infrastructure,” as Nahum Chandler might call it, that conditions our world and our thinking about the world. “Black Lives Matter” is an important declaration, not just because it foregrounds the question of unbearable brutality, but also because it performs philosophical labor—it compels us to face the terrifying question, despite our desire to look away. The declaration presents a difficult syntax or an accretion of tensions and ambiguities within its organization: can blacks have life? What would such life mean within an antiblack world? What axiological measurement determines the mattering of the life in question? Does the assembly of these terms shatter philosophical coherence or what metaphysical infrastructure provides stability, coherence, and intelligibility for the declartion? These questions of value, meaning, stability, and intelligibility lead us to the terror of the declaration, the question it conceals but engages: what ontological ground provides the occasion for the declaration? Can such ground be assumed, and if not, is the declaration even possible without it? “Black Lives Matter” assumes ontological ground, which propels the deployment of its terms and sustains them throughout the treacheries of antiblack epistemologies. Put differently, the human being provides an anchor for the declaration, and since the being of the human is invaluable, then black life must also matter, if the black is a human (the declaration anchors mattering in the human’s Being). But we reach a point of terror with this syllogistic reasoning. One must take a step backward and ask the fundamental question: is the black, in fact, a human being? Or can black(ness) ground itself in the being of the human? If it cannot, then on what bases can we assert the mattering of black existence? If it can, then why would the phrase need to be repeated and recited incessantly? Do the affirmative declaration and its insistence undermine this very ontological ground? The statement declares, then, too soon—a declaration that is really an unanswered (or unanswerable) question. We must trace this question and declaration back to its philosophical roots: the ~~Negro~~ Question.1 This question reemerges within a world of antiblack brutality, a world in which black torture, dismemberment, fatality, and fracturing are routinized and ritualized—a global, sadistic pleasure principle. I was invited to meditate on this globalized sadism in the context of Michael Brown’s murder and the police state. The invitation filled me with dread as I anticipated a festival of humanism in which presenters would share solutions to the problem of antiblackness (if they even acknowledged antiblackness) and inundate the audience with “yes we can!” rhetoric and unbounded optimism. I decided to participate, despite this dread, once students began asking me deep questions, questions that also filled them with dread and confusion. I, of course, was correct about my misgivings. I listened to one speaker after the next describe a bright future, where black life is valued and blacks are respected as humans—if we just keep fighting, they said, “we’re almost there!” A political scientist introduced statistics and graphs laying out voting patterns and districts; he argued that blacks just did not realize how much power they had (an unfortunate ignorance, I guess). If they just collectively voted they could change antiblack police practices and make this world a better place. The audience clapped enthusiastically; I remained silent. Next, a professor of law implored the audience to keep fighting for legal change because the law is a powerful weapon for ending discrimination and restoring justice. We just needed to return to the universal principles that founded our Constitution, “liberty, equality, and justice!” (I thought about the exception clause in the Thirteenth Amendment, the Three-Fifths Compromise, and the way the sharecropping system exploited the Fourteenth Amendment in order to reenslave through contract. I continued to sit in silence.) The audience shouted and applauded. I felt a pit in my stomach because I knew what I had to do; it was my time to step up to the podium—it was my nihilistic responsibility. I told the audience there was no solution to the problem of antiblackness; it will continue without end, as long as the world exists. Furthermore, all the solutions presented rely on antiblack instruments to address antiblackness, a vicious and tortuous cycle that will only produce more pain and disappointment. I also said that humanist affect (the good feeling we get from hopeful solutions) will not translate into freedom, justice, recognition, or resolution. It merely provides temporary reprieve from the fact that blacks are not safe in an antiblack world, a fact that can become overwhelming. The form of antiblackness might alter, but antiblackness itself will remain a constant—despite the power of our imagination and political yearnings. I continued this nihilistic analysis of the situation until I heard complete silence. A woman stood up after my presentation and shouted, “How dare you tell this to our youth! That is so very negative! Of course we can change things; we have power, and we are free.” Her voice began to increase in intensity. I waited for her to finish and asked her, “Then tell us how to end police brutality and the slaughter of the youth you want to protect from my nihilism.” “If these solutions are so credible, why have they consistently failed? Are we awaiting for some novel, extraordinary solution— one no one had ever imagined—to end antiblack violence and misery?” Silence. “In what manner will this ‘power’ deliver us from antiblackness?” How long must we insist on a humanity that is not recognized—an insistence that humiliates in its inefficacy? “If we are progressing, why are black youth being slaughtered at staggering rates in the twenty-first century— if we are, indeed, humans just like everyone else?” People began to respond that things are getting better, despite the increasing death toll, the unchecked power of the police state, the lack of conviction rates for police murdering blacks, the prison industrial complex and the modern reenslavement of an entire generation, the unbelievable black infant mortality rate, the lack of jobs for black youth and debilitating poverty. “This is better?” I asked. “At least we are not slaves!” someone shouted. I asked them to read the Thirteenth Amendment closely. But the intensity of the dialogic exchange taught me that affect runs both ways: it is not just that solutions make us feel good because we feel powerful/hopeful, but that pressing the ontological question presents terror—the terror that ontological security is gone, the terror that ethical claims no longer have an anchor, and the terror of inhabiting existence outside the precincts of humanity and its humanism. Ontological Terror engages this question and the forms of terror it produces.2 The event also put the metaphysical infrastructure into perspective for me. Two philosophical forces were colluding (and at times conflicting) to orient the solutions proposed and the audiences’ responses, and both presented “free black” as a concept with meaning: black humanism and postmetaphysics. I use these two terms to docket a certain posture toward metaphysics—and the ontological ground metaphysics offers. Black humanism enters into romance with metaphysics. It appropriates schematization, calculation, technology, probability, and universality—all the instruments of metaphysical thinking—to make epistemological, ethical, and ontological claims concerning blackness and freedom. Freedom is possible, then, because metaphysics provides it with ontology; from there, all sorts of solutions, policies, and practices emerge to address antiblackness. Scientific reasoning, technological innovation, and legality are tools black humanists use to quantify suffering, measure progress, proffer universal narratives of humanity, and reason with antiblack institutions. All problems have solutions for black humanists, and their task is to uncover the solution the problem conceals, as this uncovering equates to an eradication of the problem. Black humanism relies on an eclectic approach to antiblackness— Hegelian synthesis, Kantian rationalism, Platonic universals/idealism, Cartesian representation, and empiricism. In short, black humanists lay claim to the being of the human (and the human’s freedom) through metaphysical thinking and instruments. Postmetaphysics, in contrast, attempts the surmounting or twisting [verwunden] of the ground and logic of metaphysics.3 It insists that metaphysics reproduces pain and misery and restricts human freedom. Rep- resenting the human as an object of scientific thinking (e.g., biology, economics, law) destroys the spontaneity and uniqueness of the human— things that make the human special. The ground, then, upon which metaphysics relies is problematic, and this ground must be destroyed (i.e., twisted) and deconstructed (i.e., displaced) to free the human. Postmetaphysics would advocate for a self-consumption of this ground through hermeneutical strategies, unending deconstructions, and forms of plurality (such as hermeneutic nihilism). The post is rather a misnomer, if we think of post as an overcoming [überwunden]; the postmetaphysician will never overcome metaphysics. A residue will always remain, but the postmetaphysician hopes to reduce this metaphysical residue to render it inoperative. The postmetaphysician understands antiblackness as a problem of metaphysics, especially the way scientific thinking has classified being along racial difference and biology. The task of the postmetaphysical project is to free blacks from the misery metaphysics produces by undermining its ground. Hermeneutical strategies, which contest ultimate foundations, would question the ground of race (racial metaphysics) and its claim to universal truth. Black humanism and postmetaphysics, however, leave the question of being unattended as it concerns black(ness). Both assume being is applicable and operative—black humanism relies on metaphysical being and postmetaphysics relies on multiple interpretations or manifestations of being. In other words, the human’s being grounds both philosophical perspectives. Although postmetaphysics allows for a capacious understanding of the human and Being, it still posits being universally as it concerns freedom; no entity is without it, even if it manifests differently, or as difference, if we follow Deleuze. This is to suggest that both discourses proceed as if the question of being has been settled and that we no longer need to return to it—the question, indeed, has been elided in critical discourses concerning blackness. Ontological Terror seeks to put the question back in its proper place: at the center of any discourse about Being. Ontological Terror meditates on this (non)relation between blackness and Being by arguing that black being incarnates metaphysical nothing, the terror of metaphysics, in an antiblack world. Blacks, then, have function but not Being—the function of black(ness) is to give form to a terrifying formlessness (nothing). Being claims function as its property (all functions rely on Being, according to this logic, for philosophical pre sentation), but the aim of black nihilism is to expose the unbridgeable rift between Being and function for blackness. The puzzle of blackness, then, is that it functions in an antiblack world without being—much like “nothing” functions philosophically without our metaphysical understanding of being, an extraordinary mystery. Put differently, metaphysics is obsessed with both blackness and nothing, and the two become synonyms for that which ruptures metaphysical organization and form. The ~~Negro~~ is black because the ~~Negro~~ must assume the function of nothing in a metaphysical world. The world needs this labor. This obsession, however, also transforms into hatred, since nothing is incorrigible—it shatters ontological ground and security. Nothing terrifies metaphysics, and metaphysics attempts to dominate it by turning nothing into an object of knowledge, something it can dominate, analyze, calculate, and schematize. When I speak of function, I mean the projection of nothing’s terror onto black(ness) as a strategy of metaphysics’ will to power. How, then, does metaphysics dominate nothing? By objectifying nothing through the black ~~Negro~~. In this analysis, metaphysics can never provide freedom or humanity for blacks, since it is the objectification, domination, and extermination of blacks that keep the metaphysical world intact. Metaphysics uses blacks to maintain a sense of security and to sustain the fantasy of triumph—the triumph over the nothing that limits human freedom. Without blacks, I argue, nothing’s terror debilitates metaphysical procedures, epistemologies, boundaries, and institutions. Black freedom, then, would constitute a form of world destruction, and this is precisely why humanism has failed to accomplish its romantic goals of equality, justice, and recognition. In short, black humanism has neglected the relationship between black(ness) and nothing in its yearning for belonging, acceptance, and freedom. The ~~Negro~~ was invented to fulfill this function for metaphysics, and the humanist dream of transforming invention into human being is continually deferred (because it is impossible). Ontological Terror challenges the claim that blacks are human and can ground existence in the same being of the human. I argue that blacks are introduced into the metaphysical world as available equipment in human form. Black thinking, then, must return to the question of Being and the relation between this question and the antiblack violence sustaining the world. It is my contention that black thinking is given a tremendous task: to approach the ontological abyss and the metaphysical violence sustaining the world. Ontological Terror suggests that black thinking cannot be overcome— we will never reach the end of black thinking or its culmination, unlike the end of philosophy describing postmetaphysical enterprises.4 In other words, postmetaphysics has broached the question of being and has commenced the destruction [Destruktion] of the metaphysical infrastructure, which systemically forgets being. Postmetaphysics, then, is a project of remnants, as Santiago Zabala suggests. After we have used hermeneutics, deconstruction, rhizomes, and mathematical sets to devastate metaphysics, we are left with ontological rubble—a trace of metaphysics and a reconstructed being. Postmetaphysics, then, must ask, “How is it going with Being?” Or what is the state of Being in this contemporary moment, and how does the world remain open to Being’s unfolding and happening (as well as its withdrawal and abandoning of Dasein)? “How is it going with Being?” is the fundamental question of our era, according to postmetaphysics; only the twisting and severe rearranging [verwunden] of metaphysics can usher this question into the world. Both metaphysics and postmetaphysics, however, have forgotten the ~~Negro~~ Black, just as they have forgotten Being—to remember Being one must also remember the ~~Negro~~. The ~~Negro~~ Question and the Question of Being are intertwined. Postmetaphysical enterprises reach a limit in destruction, since it is the Negro that sustains metaphysics and enables the forgetting of Being (i.e., metaphysics can forget Being because it uses the ~~Negro~~ to project nothing’s terror and forget Being). In a sense, the global use of the Negro fulfills the ontological function of forgetting Being’s terror, majesty, and incorrigibility. The consequence of this is that as long as postmetaphysical enterprises leave the ~~Negro~~ unattended in their thinking, it inadvertently sustains metaphysical pain and violence. This, I argue, is why we will never overcome [überwunden] metaphysics because the world cannot overcome the ~~Negro~~ Black—the world needs the ~~Negro~~ Black, even as the world despises it. This is, of course, a Heideggerian approach to the thinking of Being and Nothing. More than any other philosopher, Heidegger pursued meta physical violence and the question of Being relentlessly, and for this reason I find his philosophy indispensable and necessary. Ontological Terror thinks with and against Heidegger, since I believe Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics can assist black studies in the tremendous task of thinking Being and blackness, as Grant Farred has suggested.5 Heidegger’s Destruktion covers a wide range of philosophical issues, and it is not my objective to address all of these complexities; my interest is the relation between Heidegger’s critique of metaphysical violence, available equipment, and the task of remembering as it concerns blackness. What I hope to broach in this book, with all the aporias such as broaching encounters, is that the ~~Negro~~ is the missing element in Heidegger’s thinking (as well as in that of those postmetaphysicians indebted to Heidegger, such as JeanLuc Nancy, Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, and Gianni Vattimo). If, as we learn in Being and Time, Dasein uses tools to experience its thrownness in the world (establishing its facticity) and to develop its unique project oriented toward the future (projectionality), the ~~Negro~~—as commodity, object, slave, putative backdrop, prisoner, refugee, and corpse—is the quintessential tool Dasein uses. The use of the ~~Negro~~ metaphysically and ontologically, as a tool, is what black thinking is tasked with pursuing. Thus, black thinking (and postmetaphysics) must ask the unasked question “How is it going with black being?” Without broaching this question, all forms of destruction are just reconstitutions, since the world continues to use the ~~Negro~~ (as black and nothing) to forget Being and the sadistic pleasure of this forgetfulness.

# Baudrillard vs. Fem IR

### Links

#### The 1ac is not art, it’s an advertisement – their attempt to trade aesthetics for the ballot colludes with the project of commercialization that values artwork insofar as it has productive potential – this process of commodification renders existence banal and sterilized as we’re plunged into a sea of indifference

Baudrillard, 93 [Jean, “*The* *Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena*,” pg. 14-5,] //Don Markos

We see Art proliferating wherever we turn; talk about Art is increasing even more rapidly. But the soul of Art - Art as adventure, Art with its power of illusion, its capacity for negating reality, for setting up an 'other scene' in opposition to reality, where things obey a higher set of rules, a transcendent figure in which beings, like line and colour on a canvas, are apt to lose their meaning, to extend themselves beyond their own raison d'etre, and, in an urgent process of seduction, to rediscover their ideal form (even though this form may be that of their own destruction) - in this sense, Art is gone. Art has disappeared as a symbolic pact, as something thus clearly distinct from that pure and simple production of aesthetic values, that proliferation of signs ad infinitum, that recycling of past and present forms, which we call 'culture'. There are no more fundamental rules, no more criteria of judgement or of pleasure. In the aesthetic realm of today there is no longer any God to recognize his own. Or, to use a different metaphor, there is no gold standard of aesthetic judgement or pleasure. The situation resembles that of a currency which may not be exchanged : it can only float, its only reference itself, impossible to convert into real value or wealth. Art, too, must circulate at top speed, and is impossible to exchange. 'Works' of art are indeed no longer exchanged, whether for each other or against a referential value. They no longer have that secret collusiveness which is the strength of a culture. We no longer read such works - we merely decode them according to ever more contradictory criteria. Nothing in this sphere conflicts with anything else. Neo-Geometrism, Neo-Expressionism, New Abstraction, New Representationalism - all coexist with a marvellous facility amid general indifference. It is only because none of these tendencies has any soul of its own that they can all inhabit the same cultural space; only because they arouse nothing but profound indifference in us that we can accept them all simultaneously. The art world presents a curious aspect. It is as though art and artistic inspiration had entered a kind of stasis - as though everything which had developed magnificently over several centuries had suddenly been immobilized, paralysed by its own image and its own riches. Behind the whole convulsive movement of modern art lies a kind of inertia, something that can no longer transcend itself and has therefore turned in upon itself, merely repeating itself at a faster and faster rate. On the one hand, then, a stasis of the living form of art, and at the same time a proliferative tendency, wild hyperbole, and endless variations on all earlier forms (the life, moving of itself, of that which is dead) All this is logical enough: where there is stasis, there is metastasis. When a living form becomes disordered, when (as in cancer) a genetically determined set of rules ceases to function, the cells begin to proliferate chaotically . Just as some biological disorders indicate a break in the genetic code, so the present disorder in art may be interpreted as a fundamental break in the secret code of aesthetics. By its liberation of form, line, colour, and aesthetic notions - as by its mixing up of all cultures, all styles - our society has given rise to a general aestheticization: all forms of culture - not excluding anti-cultural ones - are promoted and all models of representation and anti-representation are taken on board. Whereas art was once essentially a utopia - that is to say, ultimately unrealizable - today this utopia has been realized : thanks to the media, computer science and video technology, everyone is now potentially a creator. Even antiart, the most radical of artistic utopias, was realized once Duchamp had mounted his bottle-dryer and Andy Warhol had wished he was a machine . All the industrial machinery in the world has acquired an aesthetic dimension; all the world's insignificance has been transfigured by the aestheticizing process. It is often said that the West's great undertaking is the commercialization of the whole world, the hitching of the fate of everything to the fate of the commodity. That great undertaking will turn out rather to have been the aestheticization of the whole world - its cosmopolitan spectacularization, its transformation into images, its semiological organization. What we are witnessing, beyond the materialist rule of the commodity, is a semio-orgy of everything by means of advertising, the media, or images. No matter how marginal, or banal, or even obscene it may be, everything is subject to aestheticization, culturalization, museumification. Everything is said, everything is exposed, everything acquires the force, or the manner, of a sign. The system runs less on the surplus-value of the commodity than on the aesthetic surplus-value of the sign.

#### The affirmative has unknowingly stumbled into the paradox of art and life itself – if everything is art then nothing is, if everything is beautiful then nothing is – we lose all determinants and meaning as boundaries, borders, and limits are eviscerated

Fernando, 12 [Jeremy, Jean Baudrillard Fellow at the European Graduate School, “*Writing Death*,”] //Don Markos

And it is not as if doing so comes without a price: once something is completely calculable, it is also completely exchangeable, completely transparent. Here, we might momentarily tune in to Jean Baudrillard and attend to his warning that total transparency is the point where "every individual category is subject to contamination, substitution is possible between any sphere and any other: there is total confusion of types:' Thus, "each category is generalised to the greatest possible extent, so that it eventually loses all specificity and is reabsorbed by all the other categories. When everything is political, nothing is political anymore, the word itself is meaningless. When everything is sexual, nothing is sexual anymore, and sex loses its determinants. When everything is aesthetic, nothing is beautiful or ugly anymore, and art itself disappears. This paradoxical state of affairs ... is simultaneously the complete actualisation of an idea, the perfect realisation of the whole tendency of modernity, and the negation of the idea and that tendency, their annihilation by virtue of their very success, by virtue of their extension beyond their own bounds ... :' In order for any response to be possible, there have to be boundaries, borders, limits. For, without the separation, the space, one would not be able to even begin communicating with another; everything would just be the same. In other words, what has to be maintained is an exteriority, a finitude to all gestures of knowing. This also means that all responding, all response, is always already finite. If this were so, a question remains with us: what of the situation in which the call was made? The trouble is: if one can never be sure what the call even is, when, or even where, it came from-if one is blind to both the source and the object of the call-one is attempting to respond to a complete unknown, an absolute unknowability. However, even though there is no possibility of verification, one is still responding-this suggests that there is still a measure of exchange that is taking place. Whether this exchange can be measured is yet another question; one that perhaps can never be addressed. And since there is an exchange that takes place in spite of the fact that the exchange may be impossible, this suggests that the exchange is a symbolic exchange ritualistic, formal, nothing more-and nothing less-than a form; where the form of the exchange is everything-and in which each individual component is meaningless except for its role within the ritual itself.